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THE BENEFITS OF OPT-IN FEDERALISM 
Brendan S. Maher* 
Abstract: The Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) is a controversial and historic 
statute that mandates people make insurance bargains. Unacknowledged 
is an innovative mechanism ACA uses to select the law that governs those 
bargains: opt-in federalism. Opt-in federalism—in which individuals may 
in part choose between federal and state rules—is a promising theoretical 
means to make and choose law. This Article explains why and concludes 
that the appeal of opt-in federalism is independent of the ACA. Whatever 
the statute’s constitutional fate, future policymakers should consider opt-
in federalist approaches to answer fundamental but exceedingly difficult 
questions of health and retirement law. 
Introduction 
 Few national debates have rivaled the intensity of those regarding 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).1 It is not diffi-
cult to see why. Sickness spares no one. Nor, some fear, does the federal 
government. The ACA involves both. 
                                                                                                                      
* © 2011, Brendan S. Maher, Assistant Professor, Oklahoma City University School of 
Law. J.D., Harvard Law School; A.B., Stanford University. This Article is the latest in a se-
ries analyzing the importance of the Supreme Court, federalism, choice, and legal rules 
regarding the provision of retirement income and health care in America. See generally 
John Bronsteen, Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA, Agency Costs, and the Future of 
Health Care in the United States, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 2297 (2008); Brendan S. Maher, Creat-
ing a Paternalistic Market for Legal Rules Affecting the Benefit Promise, 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 657; 
Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 433 (2010). 
The series, and this paper, also draws upon research undertaken in connection with litigat-
ing Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640 (2010) and LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg, & Associates, 
Inc., 552 U.S. 248 (2008), two recent cases before the U.S. Supreme Court. Many thanks to 
the participants at the Washington University Junior Scholars workshop, as well as Tom 
Baker, Brian Galle, Abbe Gluck, Elizabeth Leonard, Abigail Moncrieff, Paul Secunda, Da-
niel Schwarcz, and Peter Stris, for their comments and criticism. 
1 The landmark legislation is actually two acts: the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). Herein I refer to 
the two pieces of legislation collectively as “ACA” rather than “PPACA.” The former is eas-
ier to read and say. 
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 Lines in the sand have been drawn over the ACA’s constitutionality.2 
Prominent law professors and dozens of state attorneys general are on 
one side; equally prominent law professors, as well as the Obama ad-
ministration, are on the other.3 Given the split among federal judges to 
have considered the question, most cannot help but wonder on which 
side Justice Anthony Kennedy will fall.4 The resolution of these consti-
tutional battles will be of unquestionable historic importance. 
 The constitutional dispute is part of a larger argument that is per-
haps America’s oldest: what is the proper role of the federal govern-
ment?5 In these debates, the federal government is often cast as either 
a tyrant or a savior.6 Much of the current thinking about the ACA pro-
ceeds along these lines.7 Yet there is a third role for the federal gov-
ernment: enabler. 
 Imagine if the federal government deployed its power to increase 
the ability of individuals and states to choose law. That is precisely what 
the ACA in part contemplates. Using a legal structure this Article de-
                                                                                                                      
2 Legislators are readying for battle as well. See Kate Pickert, Obamacare Goes Under the 
Knife, Time, Jan. 17, 2011, at 48, 48 (“[T]he enactment of [the ACA is] less like the dawn 
of a new era and more like the start of a long partisan war over whether reform should 
proceed at all.”). 
3 Compare Randy Barnett, Editorial, The Insurance Mandate in Peril, Wall St. J., Apr. 29, 
2010, at A19 (arguing that the mandate is unconstitutional), with Laurence Tribe, Op-Ed., 
On Health Care, Justice Will Prevail, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2011, at A27 (arguing that the man-
date is constitutional). 
4 See Tribe, supra note 3, at A27 (noting that Justice Kennedy has been portrayed as the 
“swing vote” in a closely divided Supreme Court). Compare Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 
16, 33–34 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding the individual mandate constitutional), and Thomas 
More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 893–95 (E.D. Mich. 2010), aff’d, 651 F.3d 
520 (6th Cir. 2011) (same), with Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1295, 1298, 1305 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding the individual mandate and entire legislation 
unconstitutional), and Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 782, 786–
88 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding individual mandate un-
constitutional). 
5 See, e.g., Rufus Davis, The Federal Principle: A Journey Through Time in Quest 
of a Meaning 86–96 (1978) (describing the debate amongst the founding fathers over the 
role of the federal government and noting the ambiguities that remained regarding the 
roles of and relationships between the federal and state governments); see also Jonathan 
Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the United States, 46 J. Econ. Literature 571, 572 (2008) 
(noting that it is unclear whether the solution for improving health care access is more or 
less federal government involvement). 
6 See, e.g., James F. Blumstein & Michael Zubkoff, Public Choice in Health: Problems, Poli-
tics and Perspectives on Formulating National Health Policy, 4 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 382, 
388 (1979) (noting the image of government as “provider of life-sustaining support” be-
cause the government has become more predominant in financing health services). 
7 See, e.g., Pickert, supra note 2, at 48 (noting that “Democrats found themselves under 
fire for backing a new expansion of federal entitlements”). 
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scribes as “opt-in federalism,” the ACA permits individuals to choose, in 
some respects, whether to be governed by federal or state rules.8 Few if 
any observers are acknowledging or seriously examining this important 
development. This Article does both, and in closing considers the in-
triguing possibility that opt-in federalism will also be of use in addressing 
the country’s other multi-trillion-dollar question of “benefits,” namely, 
how to provide retirement income in an aging America.9 
 The Article proceeds as follows: 
 Benefit law can be intimidating in its complexity and detail. Neces-
sary to any disciplined discussion is an organizing theory that aids clear 
thinking about benefit mechanisms and the legal rules governing 
them. Part I offers a general theory of benefits that explains, broadly, 
the role of individuals, government, and law in providing health care 
and retirement income.10 
 This Article identifies and explains three different models for pro-
viding citizens with health care and retirement benefits: the individual 
reliance model, the multilateral bargain model, and the public entitle-
ment model.11 The oldest and simplest model, the individual model, 
relies on the individual’s saved or current personal resources to address 
retirement or heath care needs.12 The second model, the multilateral 
model, relies on enforceable bargains between two or more players to 
supply the beneficiary with retirement and health benefits.13 The third 
model, the public model, provides retirement and health care pursuant 
                                                                                                                      
8 See infra notes 223–339 and accompanying text. 
9 Some may wonder why matters so different in character—retirement and health—
are so often discussed together as “benefits” or “entitlements.” The answer is not straight-
forward; in many ways they are so different that it is a conceptual mistake to treat them 
similarly. See, e.g., Brendan Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 Wash. U. L. 
Rev. 433, 451–64 (2010) (discussing the different nature of health and retirement prom-
ises). But legally they have been bundled together for decades; they occupy a joined space 
in the national dialogue on social and fiscal reform; and they undeniably share a height-
ened level of life significance for essentially everyone. As political scientist Jacob Hacker 
put it, the study of America’s retirement and health regimes is necessarily linked because 
in both cases citizens’ “life fortunes depend[] crucially on social benefits that they re-
ceive[] . . . .” Jacob S. Hacker, The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public 
and Private Social Benefits in the United States 6 (2002). For reasons I explain in 
Part I, this Article largely focuses on private benefit arrangements. 
10 See infra notes 29–90 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 29–90 and accompanying text. 
12 See Colleen Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today: Con-
forming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 Emory L.J. 1, 4 (2000); infra notes 34–46 and accompany-
ing text. 
13 See Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 437–48 & 448 n.18 (describing the benefit trade-
off that is bargained for in employer-provided pensions and noting that benefits are “bar-
gained for”); infra notes 47–75 and accompanying text. 
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to entitlement promises made by the government as sovereign.14 Most 
societies rely on some combination of the three, including the United 
States. 
 This conceptual scheme weaves together long-running threads of 
benefit theory and tracks implicit fault lines in national benefit debates. 
And the instrumental value of the taxonomy is significant. It clarifies at 
what level a particular benefit debate is occurring and appropriately 
frames legal and policy discussions. For example, my theory makes 
clear that the ACA is a legislative endorsement of the bargain model in 
the health benefit context.15 That Congress should have instead chosen 
an entitlement model is one type of criticism; that the ACA does a poor 
job of improving health bargains is quite another. One can, and some 
do, believe the former is true but not the latter. Moreover, as the theory 
explains, that Congress has embraced the bargain model means that 
particular care must be given to the selection of legal rules governing 
the bargain players. 
 Part II draws upon my theory of benefits to explain important fea-
tures of the pre-ACA benefit landscape in the United States.16 To an 
unusual degree, the United States has relied and continues to rely 
upon private bargains to provide benefits to its citizens.17 Perhaps 
equally unusual, given the nation’s professed admiration for federalism, 
is that the American bargain model was heavily national. Via the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),18 the nation 
relied upon the federal government, and to a large degree federal 
                                                                                                                      
14 See, e.g., Patricia Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of Social Se-
curity Privatization, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 975, 979 (2000) (describing Social Security, an example 
of the entitlement model); infra notes 76–90 and accompanying text. 
15 ACA is not exclusively about bargains; for example, it also expanded Medicaid, 
which is an entitlement program. But a central feature of the legislation is that it embraced 
the bargain model for the vast majority of those not already eligible to participate in an 
entitlement program. See infra notes 29–90 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 91–222 and accompanying text. 
17 See John Bronsteen, Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA, Agency Costs, and the 
Future of Health Care in the United States, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 2297, 2298–99 (2008) (noting 
that private health insurance is the “cornerstone” of U.S. health care); infra notes 96–129 
and accompanying text. 
18 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829. 
Easily the most thorough and fascinating account of ERISA’s political history was written 
by Professor James Wooten. See generally James A. Wooten, The Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974, A Political History (2004). ERISA was expected to be a 
landmark reform statute, but its ultimate effects were larger than even its drafters imag-
ined. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006) (stating the purpose of the Act); Maher & Stris, supra 
note 9, at 435 (describing ERISA as a “landmark statute”); infra notes 91–122 and accom-
panying text. 
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judges, to select the legal rules that govern most benefit bargains.19 ER-
ISA’s specific legal rules have been sharply criticized, but, for many rea-
sons, there has been little opportunity to meaningfully reform Amer-
ica’s benefit bargain regime.20 Part II closes by examining ERISA’s 
shortcomings in the hopes of addressing the larger problems—what are 
the optimal legal rules for benefit bargains and who should choose 
those rules?—that have long challenged would-be reformers.21 
 Part III examines an innovative solution to the problem: opt-in 
federalism, namely, vertical regime choice by individuals.22 The matter 
is far from academic. Although the ACA is perhaps the most discussed 
law in recent history, there has been little acknowledgment that the 
legislation in theory instantiates a form of regime competition by per-
mitting legal rule choice regarding the health bargain.23 It does that by 
creating an accessible individual health insurance market, and, in sig-
nificant part, by allowing employed individuals who purchase insurance 
on this individual market to partially opt-out of federal law and into 
state law.24 
 Whatever the ACA’s imperfections, the theoretical appeal of opt-in 
federalism is strong.25 Opt-in federalism is likely to maximize individual 
preferences, promote desirable evolution of legal rules, restore to the 
states their traditional function of regulating important aspects of local 
insurance arrangements, and constructively accommodate uncertainty 
and legitimate disagreement about what the optimal legal rules are.26 
Although not without drawbacks, opt-in federalism is a promising ap-
proach to answering benefit questions in both the health care and re-
tirement contexts.27 
                                                                                                                      
 
19 See infra notes 130–179 and accompanying text. In 2010, most private health insurance 
in America was supplied through employer-based (and thus overwhelmingly ERISA-gov- 
erned) arrangements. See Cong. Budget Office, Selected CBO Publications Related to 
Health Care Legislation, 2009–2010, at 23 tbl.4 (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ 
ftpdocs/120xx/doc12033/12-23-SelectedHealthcarePublications.pdf (indicating 150 million 
people were covered through employer-based insurance in 2010). 
20 See infra notes 180–222 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 180–222 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 223–329 and accompanying text. 
23 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a)(1) (West Supp. 2011) (allowing individuals to choose in 
which type of qualified health plan to enroll); infra notes 228–252 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 228–251 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 253–293 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 253–293 and accompanying text. 
27 In many ways, retirement security is where health care was in the early 1990s: a 
looming crisis with no consensus regarding the answer. Opt-in federalism, which leverages 
the power of aggregative policymaking in an appealing way, see infra notes 223–329 and 
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 Vigorous challenges to the ACA have been mounted.28 Regardless 
of the legislative or constitutional fate of the ACA, however, the legisla-
tion should be of enormous interest to observers concerned with re-
tirement and health care in the twenty-first century and the division of 
power between federal and state governments. It is a singularly useful 
vehicle through which we can refine and modernize benefit theory; ac-
knowledge the important role choice, uncertainty, and diversity play in 
the selection of legal rules; and imagine additional reforms—whether 
alternative or supplemental—that are rooted in notions of personal au-
tonomy and local rulemaking. Should the ACA be legislatively modified 
or held constitutionally invalid, whatever arises in its place would benefit 
from a careful consideration of using opt-in federalist approaches to 
answer fundamental but exceedingly difficult questions regarding 
health and retirement law. 
I. A Theory of Benefit Models 
 For modern societies, the future is somewhat predictable. What-
ever surprises lurk beyond the horizon, it is certain that there will be 
citizens who age, can no longer work, and need replacement income. It 
is equally inevitable that there will be citizens who fall ill, wish to get 
care, and need to pay for treatment.29 How can, and should, a society 
allocate resources to address these inevitable contingencies? 
 This Article considers three models: the individual reliance model, 
the multilateral bargain model, and the public entitlement model.30 
                                                                                                                      
 
accompanying text, may be a promising means to address retirement challenges that seem 
beyond the reach of traditional solutions. See infra notes 330–334 and accompanying text. 
28 See, e.g., Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1295, 1298, 1305 (holding individual mandate and 
entire legislation unconstitutional); Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 782, 786–88 (holding 
ACA’s individual mandate unconstitutional); Barnett, supra note 3, at A19 (arguing that 
the ACA is unconstitutional). 
29 By “citizen,” I imply no formal or legal meaning. I use it simply as a synonym for the 
more cumbersome phrase “member of society.” 
30 See, e.g., Dilley, supra note 14, at 979 (describing Social Security, an example of the 
entitlement model); Medill, supra note 12, at 4 (describing the individual model); Mark V. 
Pauly, Making a Case for Employer-Enforced Individual Mandates, Health Aff., Apr. 1994, at 
21, 24 (describing wage and benefit tradeoffs, a form of the multilateral bargain model). 
There is a fourth model: the charity model, where an unaffiliated third party addresses 
retirement or health needs out of eleemosynary impulses. See Nina J. Crimm, Evolutionary 
Forces: Changes in For-Profit and Not-For-Profit Health Care Delivery Structures; A Regeneration of 
Tax Exemption Standards, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1995) (describing pre-twentieth-century 
health care as having many “hospitals for the poor” that were funded by charity rather 
than patient fees). To be clear: charity care is different than care administered by a non-
profit organization. The former is a gift; the latter can be a gift, but often is pay-for-service, 
where the “pay” portion is handled either by personal resources, insurance (a type of bar-
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Logically, to satisfy benefit needs, one can rely on oneself, other private 
players, or the government.31 The benefit models a society might adopt 
correspond, respectively, to those three possibilities.32 
 Theorizing benefits in this way is useful. First, it makes intuitive 
sense to organize benefit theory along the lines of who has responsibil-
ity for planning, stewarding, or conveying the benefits.33 Second, it 
makes clear the nature and the magnitude of benefit disagreements. 
Some disputes are arguments over which model is preferable in given 
circumstances; others are about the ways in which a given model can be 
improved. Third, and most importantly, it aids in the selection of opti-
mal legal rules. Benefit rules cannot be appropriately imagined, pro-
posed, researched, or assessed absent context. 
 For example, in using a benefit bargain model, a society is imple-
menting important social policy through benefit arrangements which 
impose binding obligations on private players. And obligations—the 
negotiation, performance, and mediating thereof—come with behav-
ior-altering costs. The intricate and uncertain assessment of those costs 
is often the factor that determines what the optimal legal rules are. To 
ignore the costs of shared responsibility—that is, to overlook the inher-
ent complication of using bargains to solve allocation problems—is to 
assume away a significant component of the challenge. Indeed, the dif-
ficulty of the task of selecting ideal benefit bargain rules is part of the 
appeal of opt-in federalism. 
                                                                                                                      
gain), or the government. I do not discuss the charity model herein because neither the 
current nor expected volume of charity benefits is significant compared to the other three 
models. See, e.g., M. Gregg Boche, Health Policy Below the Waterline: Medical Care and the Cha-
ritable Exemption, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 299, 304–11 (1995) (describing, in the context of tax 
exemption status, the evolution of nonprofit hospitals from primarily offering charity care 
to offering pay-for-service care with little or no charity care); cf. Tex. Tax Code Ann. 
§ 11.1801 (West 2010) (requiring only a modest percentage of care at tax-exempt hospitals 
to be “charity care or government sponsored indigent care”). 
31 See Dilley, supra note 14, at 979; Medill, supra note 12, at 4; Pauly, supra note 30, at 
24. 
32 See Dilley, supra note 14, at 979; Medill, supra note 12, at 4; Pauly, supra note 30, at 
24. 
33 Scholars have surveyed the policy problems and insufficient financial outcomes that 
imperil various retirement arrangements. See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of 
Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the Three-Legged Stool of Social Security, Pensions, and Personal Sav-
ings, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 938, 962 (2007) (concluding that many American workers have in-
sufficiently saved for retirement). See generally Medill, supra note 12 (examining the policy 
implications of employee saving). My focus is on arranging benefit models with reference 
to both factual and legal responsibility; the latter is often overlooked, and thus insufficient 
attention is paid to the content of the legal rules governing a particular benefit arrange-
ment and how those rules should be chosen. Policy is important, but so is legal optimality. 
Study by legal academics of the latter is crucial. 
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 This Part considers each of the three models below. 
A. Benefit as Individual Reliance 
 The individual model is easy to conceptualize: the resources avail-
able to address retirement and health needs are those resources the 
person in question has personally available to satisfy those needs at the 
time the need arises.34 Such resources in effect consist of money saved, 
whether it has been saved for a long time—in other words, what we tra-
ditionally think of as savings—or whether it is money recently earned or 
acquired and then immediately transferred to address retirement or 
health care needs, e.g., using current income to pay for health needs or 
using a recent inheritance to provide retirement income. The latter 
category of personal resources can, for present purposes, be construc-
tively described as savings. After it is earned or otherwise falls within the 
dominion of the player in question, it is “saved,” i.e., not spent on 
something else, for some arbitrarily small period of time before being 
used to satisfy retirement or health needs. 
 A central attraction of the individual model is that it permits peo-
ple to live by their preferences, wherever such preferences fall along 
the continuum bounded on each end by Aesop’s fabled grasshopper 
and ant.35 Relatedly, the individual model rewards, and thus promotes, 
careful and efficient thinking by individuals regarding the trade-off be-
tween current expenditures and saving resources for future needs; such 
careful thinking may be appealing for economic or moral reasons, or 
both, depending on one’s perspective.36 Lastly, the individual model 
                                                                                                                      
34 See Medill, supra note 12, at 4. I consider the use of family resources to address such 
needs to be “individual” resources. 
35 See Bronsteen et al., supra note 17, at 2328 (2008) (noting the theoretical attractive-
ness of permitting employees to save “according to their risk and consumption prefer-
ences”). As for Aesop’s insects, the industrious ant worked diligently and saved up food for 
lean times; the carefree grasshopper failed to store food and suffered accordingly when 
winter came. Aesop’s Fables with a Life of Aesop 121 ( John E. Keller & L. Clark Keat-
ing trans., 1993). The fable has long illustrated the wisdom of planning and saving, and 
the folly of failing to do so. See id.; see also, e.g., Dilley, supra note 14, at 976 (invoking Aesop 
to illustrate opposing views regarding the provision of retirement benefits). 
36 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 
Tex. L. Rev. 1145, 1163 (1992) (collecting different historical authorities, from Aesop to 
Thomas Hobbes to Benjamin Franklin, who have suggested saving is virtuous); Edward A. 
Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 Yale L.J. 451, 522–23 (2004) (expressing 
economic concerns about self-directed benefit savings but noting that this is consistent 
with American cultural preferences for “individual ownership and control”); Martin Feld-
stein, Rethinking Social Insurance 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
11250, 2005) (making the economic observation that pension programs “depress saving”). 
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does not materially draw other players into the benefit calculus, and 
thus avoids the nontrivial transaction, strategic, and litigation costs as-
sociated with shared responsibility.37 
 The shortcomings of the individual model are many. Most chal-
lenging is that many cannot save enough; that is, some segment of the 
population simply does not earn enough today to save enough to main-
tain an acceptable standard of living and have sufficient resources to 
deal with expected retirement and health needs.38 Other problems fall 
into the “may not save enough” category. Individuals may lack the re-
sources or training to appropriately plan for future needs, a problem 
that may be exacerbated by cognitive distortions that affect the way in 
which people engage in prediction and decision-making.39 Consider-
able behavioral economic evidence exists that suggests individuals are 
particularly susceptible to cognitive biases in the benefit setting.40 Third, 
even assuming an expected benefit cost projection that a diligent, ra-
tional, and appropriately wealthy individual could save for, the variance 
around such projections, particularly for health care, is too significant 
for all but the wealthiest individuals to bear.41 
                                                                                                                      
 
37 See, e.g., Bronsteen et al., supra note 17, at 2299 (describing agency costs). Plans of 
self-reliance do not give rise to obligations; bargains do. For this reason savings made pur-
suant to a fiduciary bargain are more usefully categorized under the multilateral model. 
See infra notes 47–75 and accompanying text. It is frequently the transaction and indirect 
costs associated with the legal rules governing multilateral obligations that explicitly or 
implicitly determine the optimal legal rules. 
38 See Medill, supra note 12, at 17 (noting that in one study, of those participants who 
knew the maximum amount they could contribute to their 401(k) plans, less than half 
contributed the maximum amount, and that inability to save was one of the top three rea-
sons for opting not to contribute). 
39 See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About 
Health, Wealth, and Happiness 17–39 (2008) (discussing various systemic biases in 
human thinking); see also Medill, supra note 12, at 3–4 (noting the difficulties that indi-
viduals face in retirement planning). 
40 See Victor Ricciardi, The Psychology of Risk: Behavioral Finance Perspective, in 2 Hand-
book of Finance 85, 91–105 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 2008) (discussing cognitive biases in 
retirement planning); see also Medill, supra note 12, at 14 (noting that “[m]any Americans 
have a false sense of confidence as it concerns their own retirement”). See generally Jeffrey 
B. Liebman & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Simple Humans, Complex Insurance, Subtle Subsi-
dies (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14330, 2008) (discussing biases 
in the health insurance setting). 
41 This is why even health arrangements that are sometimes described as “defined con-
tribution” schemes, such as health savings accounts, are coupled with high deductible 
health insurance (sometimes called “catastrophic” insurance). See Bronsteen et al., supra 
note 17, at 2329–30; see also Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Re-
thinking the Debates over Health Care Financing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 375, 389 (2001) (finding that medical debt played a causal role in a significant 
percentage of bankruptcies); Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society 
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 It is uncontroversial to say that the individual model, standing 
alone, is not a comprehensive benefit solution in contemporary times. 
It adequately described American society during a time period when 
much of society either did not retire,42 did not live a significant period 
beyond retirement, or relied upon extended family for retirement 
needs;43 a period when health care was overwhelmingly palliative (and 
thus vastly less costly and variable) rather than curative;44 and a period 
when more complicated benefit arrangements simply did not exist.45 
 Importantly, however, the individual model is neither a historical 
artifact nor lacking in modern usefulness. Traditional individual saving, 
in particular, can and is an important and sometimes necessary part of 
providing desirable answers to benefit questions. But it exists largely as 
a supplement to, if not contained within, more sophisticated benefit 
models.46 The next Section discusses these models. 
B. Benefit as Multilateral Bargain 
 The multilateral model is a bargain model, and by definition more 
complicated and flexible than the savings model, because it involves at 
least two players and frequently more. The animating principle behind 
the multilateral model is that at T0, the beneficiary-to-be gives up, di-
rectly or indirectly, something of value (most often foregone wages or 
cash) for the legal right to receive services or resources from another 
                                                                                                                      
Health Care Policy, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 777, 780–81 (2006) (discussing savings and insurance 
arrangements in health care). As I explain, such arrangements are better conceived of as 
multilateral bargains, given the considerable role of the insurer. See infra note 64. 
 42 W. Andrew Achenbaum, Social Security: Visions and Revisions 105 (1986) 
(explaining that “[a]s late as 1900, roughly two-thirds of all men over sixty-five were still 
gainfully employed”). 
43 Steven A. Sass, The Promise of Private Pensions: The First Hundred Years 4–6 
(1997). 
44 The primitive nature of medicine prior to the early twentieth century meant by ne-
cessity much treatment was for comfort rather than cure. Cf. Joel D. Howell, Diagnostic 
Technologies: X-Rays, Electrocardiograms, and CAT Scans, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 529, 532–33 (1991) 
(asserting that improvements in medical technology in the nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries eventually permitted acute and curative intervention, rather than merely long-
term care). 
45 See Sass, supra note 43, at 1 (“Prior to 1900, today’s vast and complex pensioning 
apparatus existed in embryo only, and the elderly derived their livelihood from much sim-
pler sources.”). 
46 See, e.g., Medill, supra note 12, at 11 (discussing the role of individual saving and 
planning in 401(k) plans); Zelinksky, supra note 36, at 454 (noting that today’s defined 
contribution plans are mostly self-funded by an individual’s contributions to an account); 
infra note 64 (explaining how elements of multilateral plans resemble individual models). 
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party, to address a later retirement or health need.47 Importantly, the 
term “multilateral” rather than “bilateral” is used because many mod-
ern bargains involve players other than the direct parties to the bargain 
who are both compensated for their work and who, practically speak-
ing, are tied to the core bargain.48 
 Given that involving others in benefit planning and conferral is 
burdensome, the question arises: why do benefit bargains exist? Al-
though benefit bargains come in wildly different varieties, in each case 
the beneficiary’s theoretical rationale for the bargain’s appeal is that a 
bargain is preferable to a self-reliance approach because the other party 
to the bargain can provide some useful service—usually professional 
expertise or the ability to bear risk—that the beneficiary cannot suffi-
ciently provide on his own.49 A brief look at three bargain types— pen-
sion, insurance, and fiduciary bargains—shows the practical appeal of 
the multilateral model. 
1. Traditional Pensions 
 A classic example of benefit as bargain is the traditional pension, 
in which workers forego wages for the promise by the employer of re-
tirement income for life, calculated according to a defined formula.50 
Under the customary pension bargain, a worker trades current income 
                                                                                                                      
47 See Albert deRoode, Pensions as Wages, 3 Am. Econ. Rev. 287, 287 (1913) (noting 
that a “pension system” is paid for by “[foregone] wages”); Pauly, supra note 30, at 24 (de-
scribing wage and benefit tradeoffs). See generally Sherwin Rosen, The Theory of Equalizing 
Differences, in 1 Handbook of Labor Economics 641 (Orley Ashenfelter & Richard Layard 
eds., 1986) (observing the “theory of equalizing differences” suggests higher non-wage 
benefits will result in lower wages). 
48 See Pauly, supra note 30, at 24 (describing wage and benefit tradeoffs). By other 
players, I mean fiduciaries. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2006). The term “fiduciary” is 
functionally defined to include any party who “has any discretionary authority or discre-
tionary responsibility in the administration” of a plan. See id. A “plan” is ERISA’s term for a 
benefit bargain. See id.; infra note 91 and accompanying text. The bargain between the 
employer and the employees in effect sweeps in fiduciaries, on whom ERISA relies heavily 
to effectuate bargains. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (defining “fiduciary”); Colleen E. Me-
dill, The Law of Directed Trustees Under ERISA: A Proposed Blueprint for the Federal Courts, 61 
Mo. L. Rev. 825, 828–35 (1996) (discussing the importance of fiduciaries in ERISA benefit 
arrangements); see also infra note 60 (discussing fiduciary duties). 
49 See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 
Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 23, 30 (2001) (noting that employers have superior 
bargaining power than employees). 
50 See deRoode, supra note 47, at 287 (noting that a “pension system” is paid for by 
“[foregone] wages”). 
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for (1) clarity regarding the level of his future retirement income,51 (2) 
fiduciary care and investment expertise in the handling of the underly-
ing assets supporting the promised income,52 and (3) reduced risk and 
variance in connection with receiving the expected retirement in-
come.53 Today such arrangements are called “defined benefit” pen-
sions and are heavily regulated under ERISA.54 
                                                                                                                     
2. Fiduciary Bargains 
 Fiduciary bargains occur when the beneficiary party seeks to en-
gage another party with comparatively superior capabilities to act with 
heightened care in protecting or advancing the first party’s retirement 
and health interests.55 More specifically, the deployment of the fiduci-
ary’s skill and the fiduciary’s assumption of more exacting duties to the 
beneficiary are intended to increase the likelihood that when the bene-
 
51 See Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 452–55 (explaining that the aim of a “defined 
benefit” pension is to provide precision as to the level of benefit to be received). A defined 
benefit plan’s tax qualification depends on the provision of “definitely determinable bene-
fits.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (2010); see also Rev. Rul. 74-385, 1974-2 C.B. 130 (stating 
that benefits are “definitely determinable” when calculated via a fixed formula and “not 
within the discretion of the employer”); cf. Kathryn J. Kennedy, Conkright: A Conundrum 
for Future Courts, an Opportunity for Congress, in 2 New York University Review of Em-
ployee Benefits and Executive Compensation 16-1, 16-65 to -68 (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 
2011) (discussing the statutory importance that pension benefits be determinable and not 
subject to discretion of the plan administrator). 
52 See, e.g. Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The 
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1105, 1112–20 (1988) (describing fiduciary duties 
in benefit plans). 
53 Cf. Jacob S. Hacker, The New Economic Insecurity—And What Can Be Done About It, 1 
Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 111, 113 (2007) (concluding that Americans face increased eco-
nomic insecurity in part because of the move away from traditional pensions toward indi-
vidual savings-oriented retirement plans); Zelinsky, supra note 36, at 455–70 (discussing 
several reasons why traditional pensions are less risky for employees than individual in-
vestment accounts). Professor Hacker recently achieved renown as the originator of the 
“public option” for health insurance. See generally Jacob S. Hacker, Ctr. for Health, 
Econ. & Family Sec., U.C. Berkeley Sch. of Law, The Case for Public Plan Choice in 
National Health Reform (2007), available at http://institute.ourfuture.org/files/Jacob_ 
Hacker_Public_Plan_Choice.pdf?# (arguing for the creation of public health insurance to 
compete with private health insurance providers). 
54 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (2006) (defining “defined benefit plan”). ERISA’s regulation 
of certain aspects of defined benefit pensions has been accurately described as “mind-
boggling” in its detail. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-
Faire Contract in the Federal Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 153, 167 (1995). 
55 See Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 30. That the bargain is with the employer and 
not directly with the fiduciary is not here relevant. The whole arrangement is best con-
ceived of as a multilateral bargain. 
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ficiary has a need for retirement or health resources, they will be avail-
able and timely conveyed to the beneficiary.56 
 As mentioned above, a fiduciary bargain accompanies the tradi-
tional “defined benefit” pension arrangement.57 In that setting, among 
other things, the imposition of fiduciary duties on parties involved in 
the pension bargain serves to promote responsible handling of the as-
sets underlying the pension promise and to insure fair conveyance of 
the benefits when due. 58 
 In addition, a fiduciary bargain is a crucial part of, and in many 
circumstances arguably envelops, what are known today as “defined con-
tribution” pension arrangements.59 In a defined contribution retire-
ment arrangement, an employer promises to contribute some amount 
of money (whether deducted from the employee’s wages or in the form 
of a company “match” that is the functional equivalent of foregone wag-
es) to an individual investment account administered by a fiduciary on 
the beneficiary’s behalf. 60 
                                                                                                                      
 
56 See Bronsteen et al., supra note 17, at 2307–09 (describing “asset risk” and “benefit 
risk”). Asset risk is the possibility that available assets will be insufficient to satisfy the bene-
fit promise. Id. at 2307–08. Benefit risk is the possibility that the promise will not be per-
formed for some other reason. Id. at 2308–09. As I have in past work, I use the terms “ben-
efit promise” and “benefit bargain” interchangeably. 
57 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (fiduciary duties); Fisk, supra note 54, at 
167. 
58 See supra note 48; see also Bronsteen et al., supra note 17, at 2307–09 (describing the 
expectation that fiduciaries will properly manage funds and fairly confer benefits); Fischel 
& Langbein, supra note 52, at 1113–19 (discussing fiduciary duties under trust law and 
under ERISA). 
59 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2006) (defining a “defined contribution” plan). A defined 
contribution plan effectively provides a participant with a “tax-preferred savings ac-
count[].” Richard A. Ippolito, A Study of the Regulatory Effect of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act, 31 J.L. & Econ. 85, 87 (1988). But these accounts are accompanied by signifi-
cant duties on the part of plan fiduciaries. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). 
60 See Ippolito, supra note 59, at 87. Defined contribution accounts are subject to varying 
degrees of control by the beneficiary, depending on the plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (de-
fining defined contribution plan); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (relaxing fiduciary duties where the 
beneficiary exercises greater control over the plan); Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of Defined 
Contribution Plan Participants, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 71, 72 (2002) (noting that choices by partici-
pants in defined contribution plans are shaped by choices employers make regarding the 
plan structure and operation and by legal requirements). Fiduciaries must satisfy duties of 
loyalty, prudence, and investment diversification, and they must adhere to plan terms to the 
extent such terms are consistent with ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a); cf. Maher & Stris, supra 
note 9, at 458 n.124 (“For defined contribution plans that do not offer the option of invest-
ment self-direction, the promisor’s fiduciary role is obvious and enormous: the fiduciary is 
actively deciding how to invest assets beneficially owned by the plan participant.”). 
ERISA does provide an option for defined contribution plans to be structured to permit 
various levels of beneficiary control of investments and concomitantly to reduce the fiduciary 
duties owed by plan fiduciaries regarding investment losses. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (provid-
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 Defined contribution plans are sometimes conceived of as pure 
savings vehicles—and thus may seem more properly described as in-
stances of the “individual” benefit model. In fact such accounts, under 
ERISA, include as the default rule significant fiduciary promise(s) by 
the plan fiduciaries with regard to investing and/or administering the 
assets in the beneficiary’s account.61 There is little doubt that the cost 
of securing the fiduciary bargain is nontrivial and reflects a material 
role the fiduciary plays in the arrangement.62 
3. Insurance 
 Private insurance is obviously a bargain.63 Consider health insur-
ance: the insured pays premiums in exchange for the right to demand 
transfer payments equivalent in value to “medically necessary” treat-
ment.64 The premium reflects the expected cost of payments to the in-
                                                                                                                      
 
ing a “safe harbor” provision which relaxes fiduciary duties of prudence and diversification in 
cases where participant exercises investment “control”); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2010) (im-
plementing regulations). Debates over the amount of residual fiduciary duties that remain in 
such circumstances are ongoing. See Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 589–90 (7th Cir. 
2009) (discussing scope of fiduciary duties under section 1104(c) and disagreeing with the 
view of the Department of Labor); DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 410, 418 n.3 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (“[The] safe harbor provision does not apply to a fiduciary’s decisions to select 
and maintain certain investment options within a participant-driven 401(k) plan.”); DOL 
Opinion Letters, PWBA Declined to Issue Advisory Opinion Regarding Whether Nonqualified Plan Was 
Pension Plan in Effect, Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) ¶ 19,987, at n.1 (Mar. 6, 1998) (opining that 
the selection of an investment menu by the plan administrator is beyond beneficiary con-
trol); see also infra note 334. Plan structuring that truly renders de minimis the duty and liabil-
ity of the fiduciary approaches a self-reliance benefit approach. See supra notes 34–46 and 
accompanying text (describing the individual model). 
61 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104; supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
62 Although the benefit bargain is in some sense “struck” between the employer and 
the employee, the bargain is only in practice possible to the extent some players agree to 
serve as fiduciaries and be compensated accordingly. Fiduciary willingness thus serves as a 
driver of bargain terms. 
63 Insurance obtained through an employer is financed by compensation reduction, 
although most workers probably do not recognize this fact. See Alan B. Krueger & Uwe E. 
Reinhardt, The Economics of Employer Versus Individual Mandates, Health Aff., Apr. 1994, at 
34, 40 (suggesting that workers are less aware of health insurance financed by “gradual 
reductions in pay raises” than by direct individual payment). 
64 In practice, insurance always includes a small self-reliance element: insurance poli-
cies include deductibles and co-insurance requirements, which are to be funded by the 
insured’s savings (“savings” including, as I have explained, current income transfer), ra-
ther than by the insurer. See Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 Am. 
Econ. Rev. 531, 535–37 (1968) (offering the classic explanation of the utility of deducti-
bles and coinsurance). These payments by the individual are intended to reduce “moral 
hazard,” or the tendency of lowered costs of medical care to the insured to increase the 
insured’s use of medical services. Id. at 535. But essentially this use of savings is part of the 
bargain struck between the insurer and the insured, and still falls within the bounds of the 
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sured during the coverage period and a “loading cost” (the amount the 
insurance company charges for running the insurance company and 
writing policies).65 The traditional explanation as to why insurance is 
attractive is that individuals are risk averse; they prefer certain out-
comes to outcomes with equivalent expected value but higher vari-
ance.66 In the health insurance context, few people are willing to bear 
the risk that an unlikely-to-be-needed but extraordinarily expensive 
treatment could exhaust or exceed their savings, even if the expected 
value of that risk is small.67 Accordingly, risk-averse individuals are will-
ing to pay the insurance company’s loading cost (and more) to the ex-
tent that such cost is less than the amount they are willing to pay to 
avoid great variance in their expected costs.68 An additional financial 
justification for insurance is that, even for risk-neutral insureds, the in-
surance company has superior buying and negotiating power with med-
ical services providers.69 
 The multilateral model shares a problem with the individual mod-
el: some people simply do not have enough income today to save or 
                                                                                                                      
multilateral model, because the insurer has a significant portion, indeed the majority, of 
the responsibility for overall health needs. 
65 Rexford E. Santerre & Stephen P. Neun, Health Economics: Theories, In-
sights, and Industry Studies 149 (2009) (explaining the loading fee). The expected 
cost portion of the insurance premium can be thought of as the “actuarially fair” or “pure” 
premium and the remaining premium as the price of insurance. Id. 
66 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am. 
Econ. Rev. 941, 959 (1963) (describing individuals as “normally risk-averters” in his dis-
cussion of the theory of ideal insurance, and noting that “[t]his assumption may reasona-
bly be taken to hold for most of the significant affairs of life for a majority of people 
. . . .”). 
67 Arrow, supra note 66, at 959–61 (explaining the theoretical health insurance calcu-
lus). Professor Arrow’s paper is widely considered to be a foundational work in the field of 
health economics. 
68 See Pauly, supra note 64, at 531–32 (explaining that individuals prefer health insurance 
up to a certain premium that is not actuarially fair, over self-insurance); Mark V. Pauly, Compe-
tition in Health Insurance Markets, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1988, at 237, 239 (explain-
ing that insureds, when buying health insurance, are in part buying the “traditional risk-
spreading function of insurance”). Professor Pauly is credited with effectively describing, in 
the early 1990s, the individual mandate as a means to permit the use of market solutions—
i.e., bargains—rather than entitlements to solve the health insurance coverage problem. See 
Julie Rovner, Republicans Spurn Once-Favored Health Mandate, NPR, (Feb. 15, 2010), http:// 
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=123670612; see also Pauly, supra note 30, at 
21 (describing the appeal of the individual mandate in ensuring insurance coverage). 
69 See Pauly, supra note 68, at 254–55 (explaining that group insurance, by having a lar-
ger market share, can be used to extract discounts from medical service providers); see also 
Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 30 (noting that employers have superior bargaining 
power than individual employees). 
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bargain for enough to satisfy tomorrow’s needs.70 That aside, the multi-
lateral model is theoretically attractive because it combines the appeal 
of individual action with comparative advantage. The result is that ben-
efit outcomes the individual could not or would not have achieved on 
his own can be achieved through the involvement of other parties. A 
central difficulty with the bargain model is that real-life bargains suffer 
from bargaining differentials, motive problems, and strategic play.71 
Deals struck between parties of different bargaining strength may not 
reflect truly fair exchanges; employment and insurance bargains have 
long attracted particular scrutiny in this regard.72 Finally, the party to 
the arrangement that agrees to provide something—for example, the 
risk-sharer, the fiduciary, or the investment expert—is motivated by 
personal gain.73 This is not a moral criticism, merely recognition that 
the profit motivation may result in the striking of certain bargains— 
whether they are per se “unfair” or not—that insufficiently serve the 
nation’s retirement and health care goals.74 
 The shortcomings of the multilateral model present a strong case 
for government regulation of benefit bargains, whether in the form of 
statutory, judicial, or administrative rules.75 In the two landmark bene-
fit statutes of the past half-century, ERISA and the ACA, that is precisely 
                                                                                                                      
70 See Medill, supra note 12, at 17; supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the fact that many people cannot save enough money in the individual model of bene-
fits). 
71 See, e.g., Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 472–73 n.201. This observation is, to put it 
mildly, not new. But it enjoys distinguished company. See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 
18 Yale L.J. 454, 454 (1909) (declaring that “actual industrial conditions” undermine the 
appeal of “freedom of contract” theories). 
72 See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?, 5 Colum. L. Rev. 339, 344–
46 (1905) (decrying the failure of common law principles to appreciate bargaining differ-
entials in employment and criticizing “freedom of contract” justifications to void protective 
statutes). The first use of the term “contract of adhesion” to appear in a legal academic 
journal appeared in an article discussing life insurance. See Edwin W. Patterson, The Deliv-
ery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 198, 222 (1919) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
73 See Bronsteen et al., supra note 17, at 2306 (noting that ERISA permits an employer to 
employ or control a fiduciary); cf. Peter Diamond, Organizing the Health Insurance Market, 60 
Econometrica 1233, 1234 (1992) (noting that in the health care setting, a doctor serves as 
both a provider of health care advice and a provider of health care services). 
74 See Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 472–73 n.201. 
75 Cf. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 
Colum. L. Rev. 629, 629 (1943) (describing the rise of standard commercial contracts and 
the need for legal rules to appropriately police their use). Professor Kessler’s article fo-
cused on contracts of adhesion, but the insights translate to an argument for context-
variant protective legal rules in a variety of settings. Id. at 642 (“[F]reedom of contract 
must mean different things for different types of contracts.”). A contract, of course, is sim-
ply a form of bargain. See id. at 630. 
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what happened. To that this Article will return. But first, the following 
Section briefly considers the third benefit model. 
C. Benefit as Public Entitlement 
 Benefit as entitlement is a model that allocates resources for re-
tirement and health pursuant to direct political promises made by the 
sovereign and paid for via the public treasury.76 The benefit-
entitlement model differs from the individual and multilateral models 
in that benefit-entitlement approaches do not aim to “promote” ade-
quate savings and bargains to address retirement and health needs.77 
Instead, they aim to have the sovereign itself pay the bills.78 Social Se-
curity and Medicare are classic examples of benefit-entitlement ap-
proaches in retirement and health care, respectively.79 In my model, 
the defining feature of an entitlement is that the arrangement is fun-
damentally a political act.80 
                                                                                                                     
 The appeal of a benefit-entitlement model is a particularly compli-
cated inquiry. The sovereign is an utterly different actor than either 
individuals making savings decisions or parties striking a commercial 
 
76 See, e.g., Dilley, supra note 14, at 979 (describing Social Security as a “public entitle-
ment”). 
77 See id. 
78 I consider government financial support, i.e., tax expenditures, of a particular indi-
vidual or multilateral benefit arrangement to be analytically distinct from entitlement 
models; you cannot push a rope. In that way tax expenditures to support voluntary ar-
rangements are very different than direct government provision of benefits. Tax expendi-
tures to promote certain benefit arrangements are enormously important, but beyond the 
scope of this paper. As a simplifying assumption, unless I note otherwise, I assume 
throughout—a patently false assumption—that all benefit arrangements are tax-neutral, 
not because that is realistic, but because it allows clear conceptual thinking before consid-
ering the effects of tax distortions. 
79 See Dilley, supra note 14, at 979 (referring to Social Security as a “public entitlement” 
to future income). 
80 Certainly, one can imagine “entitlement” as meaning many different things. For ex-
ample, one view may be that an entitlement is an unconditional moral right; under that 
definition, Social Security is not an entitlement, because it has conditions. For my pur-
poses, however, the defining feature of an entitlement is that the government, as sover-
eign, is making a promise. That act is motivated by political considerations, not economic 
self-interest, and thus implicates an entirely different host of considerations than those 
implicated by private actors making what are essentially self-interested financial decisions. 
To the extent the government is acting more like a private actor than a sovereign, such as 
when it acts as an employer, then the benefit arrangement is more accurately conceived of 
as a bargain. Public employee benefit arrangements, however, involve a host of unique 
considerations that are beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Constitu-
tional Contracts Clause Challenges in Public Pension Litigation, 28 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 
263 (2011). 
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benefit bargain.81 The sovereign has unique power to tax, borrow, 
spend, punish, and make law; is motivated by something other than 
profit; and, in purely economic terms, has more risk-tolerance and pur-
chasing power than any private player or collection of private players.82 
This presents both advantages and disadvantages, depending on the 
specific context in which an entitlement model is used and one’s foun-
dational assumptions about the “correct” level of sovereign involvement 
in society (in either specific or broad terms).83 
 The modern political consensus (although that is today being 
challenged in some quarters) is that the entitlement model is, at least, 
the appropriate way to provide retirement and health care for those 
unable to have saved or bargained their way there.84 Beyond that, the 
appeal and appropriateness of an entitlement model inspires heated, 
sometimes febrile, debate. For example, a sovereign’s enormous re-
sources and risk-tolerance have long been invoked to justify public 
health insurance;85 conversely, a sovereign’s susceptibility to cronyism 
and unresponsiveness to market pressures have long been cited as 
countervailing reasons to disfavor public health insurance.86 That de-
bate has been resolved differently in other countries.87 
 In America, the current political environment suggests no epic 
expansion of the benefit as entitlement approach is in the foreseeable 
future. Quite the opposite: proposals to reform Social Security seek to 
                                                                                                                      
81 See generally Dilley, supra note 14 (comparing private and public retirement plans in 
discussing the debate over the privatization of Social Security). 
82 Cf. id. at 981–82, 1035 (arguing that public entitlement is more likely to satisfy re-
tirement needs than private savings and noting that it is designed to “protect the public 
interest in social stability”). 
83 See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 5, at 572 (noting the debate over whether more or less 
government involvement is the proper response to improving health care access). See gen-
erally Dilley, supra note 14 (discussing the debate over whether to privatize Social Security 
and the reasoning on each side of the debate). 
84 But see Jeremy Binckes, Tea Party Leader: We Should Abolish Social Security, Huff Post 
Pol. (Mar. 31, 2010, 11:50 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/31/tea-party-
leader-we-shoul_n_519970.html (suggesting the elimination of Social Security). 
85 See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents 148 (Bruce 
Caldwell ed., 2007) (noting the appeal of a “comprehensive system of social insurance” to 
deal with “sickness”). I do not offer an exhaustive recitation or endorsement of the argu-
ments in favor of entitlement, of course. There are many and they vary in quality. 
86 See, e.g., Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra note 6, at 398–99 (discussing advantages of 
nongovernmental approaches to cost-containment in the health care context). I do not 
offer an exhaustive recitation or endorsement of the arguments against the entitlement 
model, of course. There are many and they vary in quality. 
87 See Gruber, supra note 5, at 571 (noting that the United States has a high number of 
uninsured citizens, in contrast to other countries that guarantee universal health care). 
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reduce, rather than expand, the breadth and depth of the program.88 
And Congress, in passing the ACA, rejected both the creation of a 
“Medicare for All” health program and multiple versions of a “public 
option,” where the government would have offered need-subsidized 
health insurance to those who chose to acquire insurance directly from 
the government.89 
 Instead, health care reform took a different tact: through use of a 
mandate to obtain insurance, the federal government has essentially 
compelled people to make bargains.90 The result of this hotly-contested 
compulsion, as this Article discusses later, is to create a legal meta-
structure in which individuals and states could in some (but not all) 
respects have more effective say in shaping the legal rules that affect 
the health insurance bargain than they did prior to the ACA’s enact-
ment. To understand this increase in the power of individuals and 
states, we must look at the primary pre-ACA hurdle to individual and 
state power in the benefit context: ERISA. 
II. ERISA and the Rise of the Bargain Model 
 ERISA contains multitudes. There is no need here to plumb most 
of its specifics. Any thoughtful discussion of benefit law and policy, 
however, must necessarily recognize and understand two of the statute’s 
central characteristics. 
 First, ERISA federally regulates bargains—more specifically, em-
ployment-based benefit bargains91—at a level that markedly limits state 
                                                                                                                      
 
88 See generally Dilley, supra note 14 (discussing the recent interest in privatizing Social Se-
curity). President Obama recently appointed a bipartisan commission to propose solutions to 
the nation’s budget woes. A portion of the commission’s final proposal was to reduce Social 
Security expenditures and increase reliance on “personal retirement savings.” Nat’l Comm’n 
on Fiscal Responsibility & Reform, The Moment of Truth 48–56 (2010), available at 
http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMom- 
entofTruth12_1_2010.pdf (proposing Social Security reform). 
89 See Ezra Klein, Death of the Public Option, Wash. Post (Dec. 15, 2009, 12:14 AM), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2009/12/the_death_of_the_public_option. 
html (discussing death of the public option as a political possibility). Single-payer propos-
als, such as Representative John Conyers’s proposed bill, got even less political traction 
than the public option. See United States National Health Care Act, H.R. 676, 111th Cong. 
§ 205 (2009) (single payer scheme). 
90 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2014) (requiring individuals to 
maintain minimal essential coverage to avoid payment of tax penalty); infra notes 228–252 
and accompanying text. 
91 ERISA regulates “any employee benefit plan” established by an employer or em-
ployee organization. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2006). A benefit plan is defined as “an em-
ployee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both 
an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan.” Id. § 1002(3). 
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regulation. Indeed, to a considerably higher degree than most federal 
statutes, it reposes exclusive rulemaking authority in the federal gov-
ernment.92 Second, ERISA heavily relies upon the federal judiciary to 
fill in statutorily unresolved matters of law and policy.93 In this regard, 
the bench’s efforts have received sparse praise.94 ERISA’s ultimate re-
sult has been a set of legal rules of vast reach that please few.95 The stat-
ute’s shortcomings shed light on more attractive alternatives. 
A. Federalizing the Bargain Model 
 ERISA was enacted by the ninety-third Congress and signed into 
law on Labor Day 1974.96 It was conceived and enacted in an era that 
favored centralized solutions.97 Business conglomerates were still in 
vogue,98 and even leading Republican politicians were unafraid to in-
voke federal power to address social challenges. Consider President 
Richard M. Nixon, for example. By the time of ERISA’s passage, he had 
already resigned in disgrace over Watergate.99 Prior to his fall, however, 
                                                                                                                      
The pension plan definition encompasses both “defined benefit” and “defined contribu-
tion” retirement arrangements. Id. § 1002(2). The welfare plan definition encompasses 
health insurance. Id. § 1002(1). That ERISA is conceived of in terms of regulating “plans” 
is not important for this Article’s purposes; one can think of an ERISA plan as an ERISA 
bargain or promise, and vice versa. In practical effect, ERISA governs all health and re-
tirement bargains struck at the workplace. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, ERISA’s Curious Cover-
age, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 311, 311–12 (1998). Exceptions to ERISA’s coverage are limited in 
scope. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1)–(5) (specifying enumerated and narrow excep-
tions). 
92 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (ERISA preemption provision). 
93 See Norman Stein, ERISA and the Limits of Equity, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 
1993, at 71, 110. 
94 See infra notes 130–222 and accompanying text. 
95 See, e.g., Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme Court 
Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 951, 953 (2000) (arguing that “ER-
ISA has failed . . . miserably to serve as a beneficial consumer protection statute for ERISA 
welfare plan participants”); Bronsteen et al., supra note 17, at 2315–16 (criticizing ERISA’s 
role in generating increased agency costs in the health care setting); Fischel & Langbein, 
supra note 52, at 1105–07 (noting various criticisms of ERISA and arguing that ERISA fidu-
ciary law belongs “on the list of ERISA’s major blunders”). 
96 See Wooten, supra note 18, at 1. 
97 See, e.g., Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Co-
lum. L. Rev. 847, 847 (1979) (noting that the period from 1936 to 1976 reflected an appe-
tite for national solutions to social problems). 
98See, e.g., Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 Del. J. Corp. 
L. 1, 26 (2008) (observing that conglomerates were a “familiar” part of the landscape in 
the 1970s). 
99 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 
829 (enacted on Sept. 2, 1974). Nixon resigned in August 1974. See Joan Hoff, Nixon 
Reconsidered 338 (1994). 
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he (and other leading Republicans) either implemented or favored 
federal solutions to many national problems, including wage and price 
controls, a reduction of the speed limit, and the creation of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration.100 Indeed, Jacob Javits, a Republican Senator 
from New York, was the primary force behind ERISA’s enactment.101 
                                                                                                                     
 Prior to 1935, the United States did not have a broad-based public 
retirement system.102 By the late-nineteenth century, however, various 
private industry players had concluded that offering pensions—what 
today we would call “defined benefit” pensions103—were attractive for 
business reasons, and even moral ones.104 Accordingly, different com-
panies offered retirement arrangements that varied in their substantive 
terms, depending upon business- and market-specific factors. 
 
100 See Hoff, supra note 99, at 1–144 (discussing Nixon’s domestic policies); see also 
Bruce Ackerman, Interpreting the Women’s Movement, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1421, 1428 n.15 
(2006) (“Nixon supported the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other Great Society legislation 
. . . .”). Of course, whatever the possible wisdom of Nixon’s policies, history will have other 
good reasons to judge him harshly. 
101 See generally Wooten, supra note 18 (offering a detailed political history of ERISA 
and explaining Senator Javits’s pivotal role in drafting and passing ERISA). 
102 Social Security was enacted in 1935. Ann Shola Orloff, The Politics of Pen-
sions: A Comparative Analysis of Britain, Canada, and the United States, 1880–
1940, at 13 (1993). In Europe, Germany had the first broad public pension system, estab-
lished by Otto von Bismarck in 1889. See Axel Börsch-Supan, Anette Reil-Held & Reinhold 
Schnabel, Pension Provision in Germany, in Pension Systems and Retirement Incomes 
Across OECD Countries 160, 162 (Richard Disney & Paul Johnson eds., 2001). Other 
European countries followed. See Orloff, supra, at 14 tbl.1.1 (listing the years in which 
various European countries, Britain, and the United States first adopted old age insurance 
laws). In contrast, “the United States and Canada . . . were ‘laggards’ in the institution of 
modern [pension] programs relative to the European countries . . . .” Id. at 13. 
103 See supra note 54. 
104 See Sass, supra note 43, at 1–2. Private pensions, although not common, began to 
arise in the late-nineteenth century. Alicia H. Munnell, The Economics of Private 
Pensions 8 (1982) (describing early private pension arrangements, such as the one of-
fered by American Express in the 1870s); see also Dan McGill et al., Fundamentals of 
Private Pensions 16–20 (9th ed. 2010) (discussing early private sector pensions). By the 
1930s, approximately “[ten] percent of the nonagricultural labor force . . . were employed 
by corporations offering pension plans, although not all employees were eligible for plan 
membership.” Munnell, supra, at 8 (citing Murray W. Latimer, Industrial Pension 
Systems in the United States and Canada 42–48 (1932)). 
For a discussion of the economic appeal of pensions, see Maher & Stris, supra note 9, 
at 447 (explaining the economic attraction of pensions). Some believed pensions for eld-
erly workers—after long careers of hard work—were morally appropriate. See, e.g., McGill 
et al., supra, at 6, 20 (explaining that many employers were “not willing to discard long-
tenured faithful employees” without pensions and that “[a]t first, private pension benefits 
were universally regarded as gratuities from a grateful employer in recognition of long and 
faithful service”). 
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 Troubles arose. Whatever the merit of leaving private actors to ne-
gotiate pension terms, in many instances workers’ pension expectations 
were frustrated; companies made unfair, unclear, or insecure pension 
promises with unacceptable frequency.105 These problems with tradi-
tional pensions impelled ERISA’s enactment.106 Importantly, at the 
time of ERISA’s conception, pension bargains were by far the dominant 
employment benefit bargain in the United States: the value of assets 
committed to pension promises dwarfed the assets attributable to de-
fined contribution or health insurance employment bargains.107 Thus 
many of ERISA’s legal rules—actuarially sound funding requirements, 
vesting limitations, government guarantees—were aimed directly at 
pension bargains and applied only to them.108 In short, the ninety-third 
Congress, in enacting ERISA, was trained on solving a pension prob-
lem, not a benefits one. 
                                                                                                                     
 ERISA, however, covers much more than pensions.109 With narrow 
exceptions, it regulates all workplace benefit bargains.110 That includes 
employment-based health insurance, which in the early 1970s was con-
sidered a modest “fringe benefit” of employment rather than the costly 
bugbear it is in 2011.111 Employment health insurance had taken hold 
during World War II as a response to wage controls that limited employ-
ers’ ability to compete for workers using wage increases.112 In the post-
 
 
105 See, e.g., Wooten, supra note 18, at 51 (noting that when Studebaker Corporation 
closed its auto production plant in 1963, its pension plan did not contain enough funds to 
meet its obligations, and that some commentators believe the Studebaker fund failed be-
cause “company officials misused plan funds”). For example, reformers were troubled by 
harsh forfeiture rules. See, e.g., Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1944) 
(dealing with an employee with a 45-year tenure who was denied his pension because he 
participated in a strike years before). Another problem was performance risk: that an em-
ployer would fail to properly manage or preserve the assets underlying the promise. See 
Wooten, supra note 18, at 51. Employees expecting pensions after years of work were told 
that there was no money to pay them. See id. at 51–79. 
106 Medill, supra note 12, at 4. 
107 See, e.g., Stabile, supra note 60, at 74 (discussing the dominance of traditional de-
fined benefit pension as retirement income in 1974, when ERISA was enacted). 
108 See Medill, supra note 12, at 4. See generally Wiedenbeck, supra note 91 (discussing 
the differing categories of ERISA rules). 
109 See Medill, supra note 12, at 4. 
110 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
111 See Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 437 (defining “fringe benefit” as “any nonwage 
item of value provided by an employer to an employee”); supra note 91 and accompanying 
text. 
112 See Clark C. Havighurst, American Health Care and the Law, in The Privatization of 
Health Care Reform: Legal and Regulatory Perspectives 1, 3 (M. Gregg Bloche ed., 
2003). Prior to World War II, “[t]he vast majority of care was purchased directly by con-
sumers out-of-pocket on a fee-for-service basis in the private market place.” William D. 
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war period, health insurance became an increasingly popular benefit.113 
At the time of ERISA’s passage, the content and cost of employment-
based health insurance was not a primary concern for Congress, be-
cause “there was no crisis in health plans in 1974.”114 Nonetheless, it was 
an employment-based benefit, and there were scattered reports of abu-
sive practices.115 In the general spirit of reformist enthusiasm, but with 
far less careful thought than had gone into the specifics of pension reg-
ulation, Congress subjected workplace health insurance to ERISA’s do-
minion.116 
 Unlike the many precise rules governing pension arrangements, 
ERISA offered very few specific rules governing health promises.117 In-
stead, the primary federal rules governing health bargains were rules of 
general applicability to all benefit bargains: rules of obligation, of duty, 
of notice, and of remedy.118 Many of these rules took the form of “stan-
dards,” as opposed to classic legal rules, and thus left to the judiciary 
capacious authority and responsibility.119 
                                                                                                                      
White, Market Forces, Competitive Strategies, and Health Care Regulation, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 
137, 141 (citing I.S. Falk et al., The Costs of Medical Care 8–9 (1933)). World War II 
wage controls encouraged employers to offer health insurance, which they increasingly did 
in the post-war period. See Havighurst, supra, at 3–4. 
113 See Havighurst, supra note 112, at 3. 
114 Michael S. Gordon, Introduction to the Second Edition: ERISA in the 21st Century of Em-
ployee Benefits Law, at lxiii, lxvii–lxix (Steven J. Sacher et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000). Some 
commentators and policymakers were expressing concern about rising health expendi-
tures in general, but 1970s legislative proposals for national health insurance reform failed 
in Congress. See generally Flint J. Wainess, The Ways and Means of National Health Care Reform, 
1974 and Beyond, 24 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 305 (1999) (discussing failed 1970s health 
reform efforts). 
115 See Gordon, supra note 114, at lxix. 
116 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006) (extending ERISA coverage to welfare plans); cf. 
Fisk, supra note 54, at 165–66 (explaining that Congress gave “relatively little thought” to 
welfare benefits); Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 29 (“Health benefits were included in 
ERISA as an afterthought . . . .”). 
117 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 
829. 
118 See infra notes 130–179 and accompanying text. 
119 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2006) (describing the general standard of care 
as that of a prudent person familiar with the benefit plan matters at issue). “[C]lassic 
‘rules’ are legal directives that, in objectively discernable circumstances, impose determi-
nate results. Classic ‘standards’ are legal directives that, in circumstances possessing a cer-
tain character, authorize a range of consequences sensitive to situational facts.” Maher & 
Stris, supra note 9, at 441–42 (collecting authorities regarding the rule versus standard 
distinction); see also infra notes 130–179 and accompanying text. In this Article, when dis-
cussing legal rules, I mean both classic rules and classic standards, unless context suggests 
otherwise. 
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 In contrast to the significant authority conferred upon the federal 
judiciary, ERISA sharply preempted the authority of states to regulate 
employee benefit bargains.120 ERISA explicitly preempts, by statutory 
provision, the ability of states to make law that “relates to” benefit 
plans.121 Whatever the boundary of that vast provision, ERISA then 
“saves” to the states the authority to pass general laws of insurance.122 
Finally, ERISA “deems” any employee benefit plan not to be an insur-
ance company, and thus forbids states from regulating any employee 
benefit plan that is self-insured.123 Self-insured plans cannot be regu-
lated even by means of “saved” laws.124 
                                                                                                                      
120 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). ERISA preemption case law and commentary is labyrin-
thine at best and incoherent at worst. A coherent and readable recent treatment is that of 
Professor Wiedenbeck. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, ERISA: Principles of Employee Bene-
fit Law 245–49 (2010). 
121 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (“[ERISA] shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they 
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan [governed by ERISA]”). In 1995, 
the Court backed away from its earlier, expansive interpretation of this clause. N.Y. State 
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654–55 
(1995) (noting a rebuttable presumption against preemption in its interpretation of sec-
tion 1144(a)’s “relate to” language). 
122 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (saving from preemption state laws that regulate insur-
ance). This provision is called the “savings” clause, for obvious reasons. See id. 
123 Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (stating that employee benefit plans shall not be “deemed” in-
surance companies subject to state regulation). This provision is called the “deemer” 
clause. See id. A self-insured plan is one where the plan itself, rather than any insurer, is 
directly obligated to pay benefits to the beneficiaries. See Paul O’Neil, Protecting ERISA 
Health Care Claimants: Practical Assessment of a Neglected Issue in Health Care Reform, 55 Ohio 
St. L.J. 724, 735 (1994). 
124 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). Thus, insured and self-insured plans are treated dif-
ferently. Compare FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 65 (1990) (holding that the regula-
tion of a self-insured plan is preempted because it does not qualify under ERISA savings 
clause), with Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 758 (1985) (holding that 
state regulation of benefit plan’s insurer is not preempted because it qualifies as a “law 
which regulates insurance” under the ERISA savings clause). Neither type of plan can be 
directly regulated by states. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). However, “insurance companies selling 
health care insurance policies (and, thus, indirectly the policy benefits to plan partici-
pants) are subject to regulation by state insurance laws.” Colleen E. Medill, HIPAA and Its 
Related Legislation: A New Role for ERISA in the Regulation of Private Health Care Plans?, 65 
Tenn. L. Rev. 485, 492 (1998). Conversely, the deemer clause bars states from using gen-
eral insurance law to regulate self-insured plans. See 29 U.S.C § 1144(b)(2)(B). The dis-
tinction matters “because most employers self-insure their welfare plans, which means that 
state efforts to regulate and reform health care are largely ineffective.” Troy Paredes, Stop-
Loss Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defining the Scope of Federal Preemption, 34 Harv. J. 
on Legis. 233, 243 (1997). But see infra note 127 (discussing the regulation of stop-loss 
insurers that many self-insured plans use). 
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 In addition to explicit preemption, the courts have also read ER-
ISA to preempt certain state laws implicitly.125 Thus, even if a state law 
were outside the reach of ERISA’s enumerated preemption provisions, 
under this line of preemption reasoning, state laws that sufficiently fru-
strate or conflict with ERISA’s purpose would be preempted.126 
 The result is a regulatory scheme in which the effective level of 
federal displacement of state authority varies from “very significant” to 
“absolute,” depending on the plan structure and the state law at is-
sue.127 In any event, the combination of ERISA’s explicit and implicit 
                                                                                                                      
 
125 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 217–18 (2004) 
(“Under ordinary principles of conflict pre-emption, then, even a state law that can argua-
bly be characterized as ‘regulating insurance’ will be pre-empted if it provides a separate 
vehicle to assert a claim for benefits outside of, or in addition to, ERISA’s remedial 
scheme.”) 
126 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); Aetna, 542 U.S. at 217–18. 
127 An interesting wrinkle is that most self-insured plans actually rely on outside insur-
ance called “stop-loss” insurance to offload risk. See Amy B. Monahan, Federalism, Federal 
Regulation, or Free Market? An Examination of Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 1361, 1372–73 (describing stop-loss insurance). Payments above a certain amount are 
covered by the stop-loss insurer; easily triggered stop-loss policies are functionally little 
different from a traditionally insured plan. See id. “ERISA fails to clearly define the scope of 
federal preemption of states’ attempts to regulate self-insured plans with stop-loss cover-
age.” Jeffrey G. Lenhart, ERISA Preemption: The Effect of Stop-Loss Insurance on Self-Insured 
Health Plans, 14 Va. Tax Rev. 615, 616 (1995). The circuit courts of appeals are split over 
the degree to which ERISA preempts stop-loss plan regulation, although the majority view 
is that state regulation is preempted. Paredes, supra note 124, at 251–60 (discussing the 
circuit split). Compare Tri-State Mach., Inc. v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 309, 315 
(4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a plan covered by stop-loss insurance is self-insured for ER-
ISA preemption purposes and thus is exempt from indirect state insurance regulation), 
with Mich. United Food & Commercial Unions v. Baerwaldt, 767 F.2d 308, 311–13 (6th Cir. 
1985) (holding that a plan covered by stop-loss insurance is “insured,” and the stop-loss 
provider is thus subject to state insurance regulation). The Supreme Court has not re-
solved the question. Cf. Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or “One 
Good Loophole Deserves Another,” 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 89, 110–12 (2005) 
(arguing that state regulators can use the “savings clause” to directly regulate stop-loss 
insurance companies). 
To summarize: States cannot regulate self-funded plans. See supra note 124. Some but 
not all circuit courts have held that states cannot regulate nominally self-funded plans that 
use stop-loss insurance. Many plans are either purely self-funded or self-funded and use 
stop-loss insurance. As a result, a significant number of employment-based health insur-
ance is provided in such a way to be beyond the reach of state regulatory power. Thus, 
many employers have been in effect able to opt out of state authority. 
Of course, employers are not individuals and have different reasons to choose law. So-
ciety will get different legal rules, and serve different values, if law is being driven by em-
ployer choice rather than individual choice. A notable feature that the meta-structure the 
ACA contemplates, and a significant part of its theoretical appeal, is vertical regime choice 
by individuals. In addition, when individuals choose state law under the ACA, they do not 
drag employers with them, as employers essentially do to employees when they choose 
federal law under ERISA. In other words, to the degree the ACA empowers individuals to 
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preemptive power has severely constrained states from engaging in ad-
ditional or supplemental state regulation of benefit bargains.128 Com-
mentators have extensively criticized both ERISA’s preemptive scheme 
and the judicial interpretation of it. 129 
B. Judicializing the Bargain Model 
 Congress left considerable work to the judiciary in giving content 
to ERISA’s flexible statutory standards.130 Key judicial tasks include 
fleshing out rules of obligation, interpretation, review, and remedy.131 
These issues have drawn the attention of the Supreme Court on a regu-
lar basis.132 They are very important because they define the particulars 
of private enforcement, on which ERISA relies significantly to shape 
                                                                                                                      
make choices about law, it also partners them with a player who ex ante agrees with that 
choice. See infra notes 223–329 and accompanying text. 
128 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). “ERISA preemption has thwarted [health] reform efforts in 
a large number of states.” Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA 
Preemption? A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 Harv. J. on Legis. 35, 36 (1996); see 
also Bogan, supra note 95, at 996 (“ERISA super-preemption . . . harms millions of workers 
by nullifying a myriad of state health care consumer protections.”); Margaret G. Farrell, 
ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Managed Health Care: The Case for Managed Federalism, 23 
Am. J.L. & Med. 251, 252 (1997) (describing a regulatory void where states cannot regulate 
and the federal government has not regulated). But compare Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. 
Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that the Maryland “pay or play” health 
insurance scheme preempted), with Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 546 
F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the San Francisco “pay or play” law not pre-
empted). 
129 See, e.g., O’Neil, supra note 123, at 727–38 (criticizing ERISA preemption). See gener-
ally Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 619 (1994) 
(same). 
130 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2006) (the “exclusive benefit rule”); Fischel & 
Langbein, supra note 52, at 1110 (criticizing the exclusive benefit rule for sweeping too 
broadly); Stein, supra note 93, at 110 (explaining that ERISA left open questions for the 
courts to answer). 
131 See Stein, supra note 93, at 110. 
132 See generally, e.g., Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149 (2010) 
(reviewing whether, under ERISA, a claimant for attorney’s fees and costs must first be a 
“prevailing party”); Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640 (2010) (reviewing whether a 
plan administrator’s error in interpreting a plan justifies denying the administrator defer-
ence for later interpretations of the plan); Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. 
Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (2009) (reviewing an ERISA plan administrator’s interpretation of the 
documents governing the plan); Metro. Life Ins. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008) (reviewing 
what considerations a reviewing court should consider in determining whether a plan 
administrator abused its discretion in denying benefits under an ERISA plan); LaRue v. 
DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248 (2008) (reviewing a plan participant’s rights 
to remedy under ERISA for fiduciary breaches that impaired the value of plan assets in a 
participant’s individual account). 
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conduct in the first instance and provide relief in the case of wrongdo-
ing.133 
 Before considering the Court’s decisions, recall the stage. ERISA 
does not require any employer to provide benefits; it only regulates 
promises voluntarily made.134 Of course, legal rules that make benefit 
arrangements clearer or more secure come with an expected price 
(and some level of uncertainty around that expected price). Increased 
cost and uncertainty associated with understanding, complying with, or 
litigating a particular rule has a potentially chilling effect: it may deter 
employers from offering benefits in the first place, or it may result in 
less generous offers being made.135 ERISA’s regulatory approach in-
herently involves a tradeoff between benefit security, clarity, and cost.136 
                                                                                                                     
 There is no doubt that Congress, in enacting ERISA, was well 
aware that it was increasing the cost of striking benefit bargains.137 The 
challenge is resolving precisely how much security and clarity are to be 
prioritized over cost.138 To the extent the statute does not plainly an-
swer that question in a given setting, how should statutory ambiguity or 
silence be resolved? In important areas—fiduciary status, plan interpre-
tation, judicial review, and remedy—the Court has tended to choose 
legal rules that prioritize cost and volatility reduction over benefit secu-
rity.139 It has done so either by raising the threshold requirement for 
court intervention or limiting the relief available.140 
 
 
133 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987) (“The civil enforcement 
scheme of § 502(a) is one of the essential tools for accomplishing the stated purposes of 
ERISA.”). 
134 Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996) (“Nothing in ERISA requires 
employers to establish employee benefits plans. Nor does ERISA mandate what kind of 
benefits employers must provide if they choose to have such a plan.”). 
135 See Brendan S. Maher, Creating a Paternalistic Market for Legal Rules Affecting the Benefit 
Promise, 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 657, 659. 
136 See Maher, supra note 135, at 659 (discussing the policy tradeoff inherent in ER-
ISA); Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of ERISA, 61 
Hastings L.J. 131, 133 (2009) (arguing that the Court has prioritized cost reduction over 
protecting beneficiaries, contrary to congressional wishes). 
137 See Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 435 (explaining that rules that provide security 
and clarity increase cost). 
138 See, e.g., Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1648–49 (“We have therefore recognized that ERISA 
represents a careful balancing between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights 
under a plan and the encouragement of the creation of such plans.”) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Dana M. Muir, The Plan Amendment Trilogy: Settling the 
Scope of the Settlor Doctrine, 15 Lab. Law. 205, 213 (1999) (noting the “inherent tension” 
between protecting participants and encouraging plan sponsorship). 
139 See, e.g., LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250–51 (limiting fiduciary remedy); Hughes Aircraft Co. 
v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443–45 (1999) (narrowing the definition of “fiduciary” through 
the settlor doctrine); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108–15 (1989) 
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 Many of ERISA’s protections hinge upon the status of the alleged 
bad actor as a fiduciary.141 In a series of cases in the 1990s, the Court 
narrowed the functional definition of “fiduciary” by announcing what is 
known as the “settlor doctrine.”142 Where an actor is designing, amend-
ing, or terminating a plan, those actions are not fiduciary actions, but 
rather “settlor” actions that do not trigger ERISA’s fiduciary provi-
sions.143 The rationale was that employers who created or amended 
plans were acting akin to the settlor of a trust, who historically could act 
freely in fashioning the trust.144 The word “settlor” does not appear in 
ERISA;145 the settlor doctrine is a judge-made concept that reflects the 
conclusion that key aspects of the benefit bargain are matters of busi-
ness discretion in which neither ERISA nor the courts should inter-
fere.146 
                                                                                                                      
 
(holding that a court should use an arbitrary and capricious standard to review a fiduci-
ary’s decision of when a plan awards the fiduciary discretion). 
140 See LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250–51; Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443–45; Firestone, 489 U.S. at 108–
15. 
141 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (2006) (defining “fiduciary”); id. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (im-
posing traditional trust law duty of loyalty on fiduciaries); supra note 48 (identifying and 
describing fiduciary definitions in ERISA); see also John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by 
“Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 Co-
lum. L. Rev. 1317, 1325 (2003) (“ERISA subjects all significant aspects of plan administra-
tion to fiduciary duties and remedies derived from trust law . . . .”). 
142 See, e.g., Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443–45; Lockheed, 517 U.S. at 890–91; Curtiss-Wright 
Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 81–82 (1995). 
143 See Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443–45; Lockheed, 517 U.S. at 890–91; Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. 
at 81–82. The decisions in Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443–45, Lockheed, 517 U.S. at 890–91, and 
Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. at 81–82, all address the scope of the settlor doctrine. There are 
modest limits in ERISA regarding plan formation or amendment. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1102(b)(3) (2006) (requiring the establishment of procedure for amending a plan). 
144 See Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443–45; Lockheed, 517 U.S. at 890–91; Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. 
at 81–82. 
145 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 
829. 
146 See Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443–45; Lockheed, 517 U.S. at 890–91; Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. 
at 81–82. The settlor doctrine is not clearly foreclosed by the statute’s text, has policy ap-
peal, and may very well express congressional intent. Although the doctrine has merit, 
influential commentators have criticized the Court’s reasoning. See, e.g., Dana M. Muir, 
Fiduciary Status as an Employer’s Shield: The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, 2 U. Pa. J. Lab. 
& Emp. L. 391, 425–26 (2000) (describing and criticizing the settlor doctrine); Marilyn J. 
Ward Ford, Broken Promises: Implementation of Financial Accounting Standards Board Rule 106, 
ERISA, and Legal Challenges to Modification and Termination of Postretirement Health Care Benefit 
Plans, 68 St. John’s L. Rev. 427, 446–50 (1994) (arguing, in advance of the settlor doc-
trine cases, that “postretirement health care benefit plans” were intended to be protected 
by ERISA). The point, however, is merely that the Court’s creation of the doctrine has 
reduced the reach of ERISA’s fiduciary provisions. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 
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2. Deference 
 Fiduciaries administer all benefit plans pursuant to written instru-
ments.147 In 1989, in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that if a plan by its terms awards a fiduciary discre-
tion in administering the plan, then when reviewing the fiduciary’s 
conduct, the Court will use an “arbitrary and capricious” standard.148 
Unless the fiduciary acted unreasonably, the court will defer to its 
judgment.149 Predictably, plan drafters thereafter included such discre-
tionary provisions as a matter of course.150 
 The Court’s lenient standard worried commentators because ER-
ISA does not prohibit the use of fiduciaries who are employed or con-
trolled by the employer (to the contrary, it is commonplace).151 Many if 
not most fiduciaries who enjoy judicial deference labor under some lev-
el of conflict, and various scholars have expressed concern about biased 
plan administration.152 The Court remains enthusiastic about its defer-
ential mode of review and has declined opportunities to change 
course.153 In two recent decisions, the Court held that the arbitrary and 
capricious standard is appropriate notwithstanding either (1) the pres-
ence of a stark conflict—for example, where the fiduciary construing 
the terms of the bargain is the same insurance company paying out 
claims—or (2) an instance of prior unreasonable conduct by the admin-
istrator—for example, where earlier in the benefit dispute, the adminis-
                                                                                                                      
211, 226–30 (2000) (holding that choosing to structure a plan as a health maintenance 
organization is not a fiduciary act, nor is a mixed eligibility and treatment decision). But see 
Aetna, 542 U.S. at 218 (holding that a benefit determination is “generally a fiduciary act”). 
147 See supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining that fiduciaries administer 
plans); supra note 91 and accompanying text (explaining that plans are benefit bargains). 
148 See 489 U.S. at 108–15 (articulating the standard of review in benefit determination 
cases). 
149 Id. at 111–14. 
150 See, e.g., Michael J. Canan & William D. Mitchell, Employee Fringe and Wel-
fare Benefit Plans 591 (1997) (discretionary clause in model welfare plan); John H. 
Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 207, 220 (predicting inser-
tion of discretionary clauses in plans); 2 Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) ¶ 30,047 (illustrating a 
model defined benefit plan with a discretionary clause). 
151 See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (2006); Fischel & Langbein, supra note 52, at 1126 (not-
ing that plan sponsors “routinely” select fiduciaries from the “ranks of management”). 
152 See Bronsteen et al., supra note 17, at 2304–19 (arguing that conflicted fiduciaries 
threaten fair delivery of health care); John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The 
Unum/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 1315, 1316 (2007) (“Most ERISA plan benefit denials are the work of conflicted deci-
sionmakers.”). 
153 See, e.g., Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1644; Glenn, 544 U.S. at 110–19. 
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trator behaved unreasonably.154 In each opinion, the Court stressed the 
appeal of resolving benefit disputes without judicial intervention.155 
3. Remedies 
 ERISA provides multiple remedies to beneficiaries wronged under 
the statute or the governing plan. Three cover the overwhelming ma-
jority of ERISA disputes.156 The first is a “benefits” remedy designed to 
allow beneficiaries to obtain benefits that were promised but not 
paid;157 the second is a “fiduciary” remedy designed to police inappro-
priate fiduciary behavior;158 and the third is a “catch-all” remedy de-
signed to afford “appropriate equitable relief” in case of a violation of 
ERISA or the terms of the governing plan.159 Each remedy bears sig-
nificant Court-imposed limitations.160 
 The benefits remedy has been interpreted to include only the val-
ue of the benefit that was not properly conferred.161 For example, in 
the case of a medical treatment held to have been wrongfully denied 
under the terms of the plan, the plaintiff’s recovery would be limited to 
the value of the benefit withheld; consequential damages to make the 
plaintiff whole for physical or financial injuries suffered as a result of 
                                                                                                                      
154 See Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1644 (holding that a deferential review can survive mis-
take); Glenn, 554 U.S. at 110–19 (confirming application of the arbitrary and capricious 
standard in cases of conflict, but noting that a review should consider the “circumstances” 
of the conflict). 
155 Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1650; Glenn, 554 U.S. at 116. 
156 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006) (benefits remedy); id. § 1132(a)(2) (fiduciary 
remedy); id. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (catch-all remedy). 
157 See id. § 1132(a)(1)(B). 
158 See id. § 1132(a)(2). 
159 See id. § 1132(a)(3)(B); see also Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 465 (noting that the 
Supreme Court has “exploited textual ambiguity” in ERISA by “developing several restric-
tive ‘judicial glosses’”). 
160 See, e.g., LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250–51 (limiting the fiduciary remedy); Sereboff v. Mid 
Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 361–62 (2006) (limiting the catch-all remedy); Great-
W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002) (same); Mertens v. Hewitt 
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256–61 (1993) (same); Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 
134, 148 (1985) (limiting the benefits remedy). 
161 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); Russell, 473 U.S. at 148. 
[T]he relevant text of ERISA, the structure of the entire statute, and its legis-
lative history all support the conclusion that in § 409(a) Congress did not in-
tend to provide, and did not intend the judiciary to imply, a cause of action 
for extracontractual damages caused by improper or untimely processing of 
benefit claims. 
Russell, 473 U.S. at 148. 
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the wrongful denial are not available.162 Nor are punitive damages 
available.163 
 The fiduciary remedy—which polices fiduciary breaches, the core 
malfeasance ERISA was conceived to deter—has been interpreted to 
apply only in limited situations: when a fiduciary’s misconduct has re-
sulted in a loss to the plan or a gain to the fiduciary.164 Yet fiduciary 
misconduct can occur, and cause injury, when neither the plan is hurt 
nor the fiduciary advantaged.165 Indeed, the text of the fiduciary provi-
sion seemingly contemplates circumstances other than plan injury or 
fiduciary gain in which a court might provide relief.166 As a result of the 
                                                                                                                      
 
162 Russell, 473 U.S. at 148. The 1985 Supreme Court case of Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. 
v. Russell in fact involved a section 1132(a)(2) claim, but its limit on “extracontractual” 
damages has widely been interpreted by courts and commentators to apply to section 
1132(a)(1)(B) benefit claims. See id.; see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & Alan O. Sykes, The As-
sault on Managed Care: Vicarious Liability, ERISA Preemption, and Class Actions, 30 J. Legal 
Stud. 625, 632 (2001) (observing that “consequential damages are not allowed”). This has 
been passionately criticized. See, e.g., George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Extracontractual Damages 
Mandated for Benefit Claims Actions, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 611, 647 (1994) (referring to conse-
quential damage limits as “pure fiction—caused either by vicious judicial and legal subter-
fuge or, more likely, gross judicial and legal malpractice on the part of [the] Supreme 
Court”). 
163 Peter K. Stris, ERISA Remedies, Welfare Benefits, and Bad Faith: Losing Sight of the Cathe-
dral, 26 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 387, 394–95 (2009) (noting the absence of consequen-
tial and punitive damages under ERISA). 
164 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2); LaRue, 552 U.S. at 254 (noting that the fiduciary remedy 
was intended to protect a plan’s financial integrity and that a plaintiff who receives all 
benefits to which she was entitled under a plan, although late, is not eligible for relief un-
der ERISA’s section 1132(a)(2)). In the 2008 Supreme Court case of LaRue v. DeWolff, 
Boberg, & Associates, Inc., the beneficiary allegedly lost money as a result of plan administra-
tors failing to follow his investment instructions. 552 U.S. at 250–51. At issue was whether 
the fiduciary remedy was triggered. Id. at 250. The Court’s decision assumed there was a 
fiduciary breach and held relief available, but only because it held there was a loss to the 
plan. See id. at 252–53. Were the fiduciary remedy not constricted, it would have applied 
regardless of whether the plan suffered a loss. See id.; see also Russell, 473 U.S. at 142 (“A fair 
contextual reading of the statute makes it abundantly clear that its draftsmen were primar-
ily concerned . . . with remedies that would protect the entire plan, rather than with the 
rights of an individual beneficiary.”). 
165 See, e.g., Farr v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, Inc., 151 F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding 
that misrepresentation in the form of bad tax advice hurt the beneficiary, but was not re-
mediable because the misrepresentation neither injured the plan nor benefitted the fidu-
ciary). 
166 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). Any fiduciary who breaches any of the fiduciary duties 
imposed by ERISA 
shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan re-
sulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such 
fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fidu-
ciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the 
court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary. 
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narrow interpretation of the fiduciary remedy, however, lower courts 
have struggled to handle situations in which a clear fiduciary breach 
has occurred but the “plan loss” or “fiduciary gain” triggering condi-
tions are not present.167 
 Limitations on the first two remedies might be of little conse-
quence if the third remedy, the “catch-all” remedy, was interpreted ex-
pansively.168 The opposite is true.169 In a series of decisions, the Su-
preme Court has held that the catch-all remedy is burdened by a sig-
nificant constraint.170 The relief available under the catch-all remedy is 
limited to the relief “typically available” in historical equity, that is, in the 
days of the divided bench.171 Roughly, a plaintiff in the twenty-first cen-
tury seeking relief under the catch-all remedy is limited to the equita-
ble relief of the nineteenth.172 What the latter entails precisely is dis-
puted, but according to the Court it only very rarely, if ever, includes 
relief resembling traditional consequential damages.173 
 The aggregate effect of the Court’s work has been to use narrower 
obligations, lenient interpretative and review standards, and highly cir-
cumscribed remedies to reduce the judiciary’s role in policing em-
ployment benefit bargains.174 Commentators, unable to square the 
Court’s decisions with notions of ERISA as a protective statute, with the 
doctrinal skeleton of trust law, or with traditional interpretative-
methodological frames, have criticized the Court’s jurisprudence.175 
                                                                                                                      
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). 
167 See, e.g., Farr, 151 F.3d at 911 (holding that bad tax advice is not remediable under 
ERISA, notwithstanding the existence of a fiduciary breach). 
168 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(2), (a)(3)(B). 
169 See id. § 1132(a)(3)(B). 
170 See, e.g., Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 361–62; Knudson, 534 U.S. at 210; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 
256–61. 
171 See Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 361; Knudson, 534 U.S. at 210; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256–61; see 
also Langbein, supra note 141, at 1348–63 (discussing Mertens and Knudson). 
172 See Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 361; Knudson, 534 U.S. at 210; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256–61. 
173 Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256 (holding that equitable relief refers to “those categories of 
relief that were typically available in equity [and] not compensatory damages”); see also 
Langbein, supra note 141, at 1318–19 (explaining that the Court wrongly held for equita-
ble relief to exclude monetary relief); cf. Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist 
Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 Ind. L.J. 223, 231–71 (2003) (discussing at length 
the Court’s interpretation of “equitable relief” and the difficulties with the Court’s posi-
tion). Happily, the Court’s view may be changing. In the recently decided Cigna Corp. v. 
Amara, the Court concluded that historical equity, and thus ERISA, permitted remedies, 
such as “surcharge,” which are functionally similar (though not identical) to claims for 
consequential damages. See 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1880 (2011). 
174 See LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250–51; Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443–45; Firestone, 489 U.S. at 108–
15; supra notes 130–179 and accompanying text. 
175 See supra notes 35, 48, 52, 128, 129, 136, 146, 150 and accompanying text. 
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Many of those criticisms, certainly, have merit. Yet, in terms of offering 
a persuasive account of why the Court has done what it has done—as 
well as laying bare fundamental problems with the current way modern 
benefit law is conceived—a realist approach offers the most promise. 
 As I have explained elsewhere, the Court’s decisions evidence acute 
fear of legal rules that could undermine the frequency and generosity of 
bargains, not only because Legal Rule A will have a significant expected 
cost, but also because there will be significant variance around the ex-
pected cost of Legal Rule A.176 More bluntly, what the Court has done 
with respect to ERISA bargains—which govern the delivery of trillions of 
dollars of retirement income and health care in this country—is to have 
largely succumbed to a particular policy judgment.177 It has decided that 
the cost and volatility associated with the traditional level of judicial in-
volvement in private disputes is unacceptably high and would under-
mine the ERISA benefit model.178 Instead, the Court has articulated 
constrictive legal rules that—by sharply limiting the role of courts in de-
fining and policing ERISA bargains—reduce the cost and uncertainty 
associated with making benefit promises.179 
C. Criticizing the ERISA Bargain Model 
 The ways in which ERISA allocates power regarding the law of ben-
efit bargains—to the federal government and, then, in significant meas-
ure, to federal judges—are structurally unappealing. ERISA, in effect, 
lashes much of the country’s benefit rules to a single federal mast in a 
ship captained by judges.180 It is a classic piece of anti-federalism.181 The 
appeal of an alternative approach, opt-in federalism, is discussed be-
low.182 But before considering the alternative, it is necessary to consider 
in some detail why ERISA is in many respects a failure.183 
                                                                                                                      
176 See Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 464–73. 
177 See, e.g., LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250–51; Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443–45; Firestone, 489 U.S. at 
108–15. 
178 See, e.g., LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250–51; Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443–45; Firestone, 489 U.S. at 
108–15. 
179 See, e.g., LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250–51; Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443–45; Firestone, 489 U.S. at 
108–15; see also Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 435 (noting the tradeoff in legal rules). 
180 See Stein, supra note 93, at 110 (noting that ERISA left open questions for the courts 
to resolve). 
181 See Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 917, 917 (1985) (noting 
that “[f]ederalism seeks to maintain political decentralization”). 
182 See infra notes 253–293 and accompanying text. 
183 See Bogan, supra note 95, at 953 (noting that “ERISA has failed . . . miserably”). 
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 Consider first the Supreme Court’s work.184 Many observers, in-
cluding dissenting members of the Court, believe the Court has been 
materially unfaithful to Congress’s protective intent.185 Congress clearly 
prioritized benefit security and clarity over minimizing costs; that is why 
it enacted ERISA.186 To be sure, legal rules that are extraordinarily cost-
ly or extremely volatile (such as punitive damages), might have been 
outside of Congress’s protective intent because they come at too high 
of a price.187 Under this thinking, the most intuitively sensible frame-
work to adopt, given the statute’s history and expressed “security” pur-
pose, is that when balancing concerns of security and cost, courts 
should use a rebuttable presumption favoring security.188 Such runs 
squarely counter to the Court’s pattern of decisions.189 
 I am sympathetic to this line of reasoning and believe it to be 
largely correct.190 But the true question is more difficult than the bi-
nary one of whether the Court has been faithful or not, with the only 
possible answers being “yes” or “no.” The reality is that Congress, in ex-
pressing itself, fell short of perfection. In several crucial respects, the 
federal legislature had only the vaguest of intents, conflicting intent, no 
specific intent at all, or an intent that judges address certain matters 
through the development of common law.191 The consequence is that 
courts, including the Supreme Court, have been forced into a policy-
making role in which they face numerous institutional disadvantages.192 
                                                                                                                      
 
184 See, e.g., LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250–51; Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443–45; Firestone, 489 U.S. at 
108–15. 
185 See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 224–34 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (concluding that Con-
gress did not intend the “catch-all” provision to be limited by the Court’s historical equity 
test); Secunda, supra note 136, at 133. See generally Langbein, supra note 152 (arguing that 
the Supreme Court failed to implement congressional intent). 
186 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006) (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of [the Act] 
to protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans 
and their beneficiaries . . . .”). The statute, after all, has the word “security” in its title. 
187 See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 270 (White, J., dissenting) (concluding that Congress did 
not intend for punitive damages to be recoverable under the “catch-all” remedy). 
188 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b). 
189 See, e.g., LaRue, 552 U.S. at 250–51; Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443–45; Firestone, 489 U.S. at 
108–15. 
190 See Bronsteen et al., supra note 17, at 2304–19; Maher, supra note 135, at 669–82; 
Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 464–73. 
191 See Stein, supra note 93, at 110. 
192 See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 513 (1982) (observing that when “the rele-
vant policy considerations do not invariably point in one direction, and there is vehement 
disagreement over the validity of the [relevant] assumptions . . . [t]he very difficulty of 
these policy considerations, and Congress’ superior institutional competence to pursue 
this debate, suggest that legislative not judicial solutions are preferable”). And scholars 
have recently begun to explore the degree to which judicial “cognitive illiberalism” may 
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That they may have done a poor job does not change the fact that they 
were dealt a very challenging hand. 
 To understand the difficult position courts have been put in, con-
sider the proposition that a proposed legal rule is unattractive because 
its imposition could reduce the frequency or generosity of benefit bar-
gains. Whether that is actually true for a particular legal rule is a com-
plicated matter of policy and empirics. Put another way: if using Less 
Protective Legal Rule A will result in more bargains, it will also likely 
result in more breaches. Is the marginal increase in bargains, on bal-
ance, “worth more” than the marginal increase in breaches? When the 
answers to such questions, as here, directly implicate the contour and 
equities of the nation’s retirement and health policy, such answers 
should flow from legislative or agency officials, not Article III judges.193 
They are neither trained for nor enthusiastic about such a role.194 
 More troublingly, the epistemological near-impossibility of cor-
rectly ascertaining Proposed Protective Rule A’s marginal value and 
cost in the course of a behind-the-bench balancing test obscures a very 
important fact. It obscures the fact that the ontological answer to the 
question of marginal value and cost will vary with the subject matter of 
the benefit bargain to be governed by Proposed Protective Rule A. For 
example, there is little independent reason to believe, ex ante, that le-
gal rules governing obligations, judicial review, and remedy for defined 
benefit promises and health insurance promises should be “one-size-
fits-all.”195 
                                                                                                                      
 
manifest itself in workplace (including benefit) disputes. Paul M. Secunda, Cognitive Illiber-
alism and Institutional Debiasing Strategies, 49 San Diego L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper s.cfm?abstract_id=1777104. 
193 See Patsy, 457 U.S. at 513. 
194 The Court’s frequent taking of ERISA cases may be motivated more by a sense of 
judicial duty than intellectual interest. Justice David Souter, upon retirement, cited as one 
motivation for his departure a lack of interest in “numbingly technical cases involving ap-
plications of pension or benefits law.” Jess Bravin & Evan Perez, Justice Souter to Retire from 
Court, Wall St. J., May 1, 2009, at A1. There was much to recommend about Justice Sou-
ter, but there is no accounting for taste. 
195 See Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra note 6, at 401 (“[T]here is a strong argument that 
‘no single standard and style of health care can be appropriate for all Americans, given 
their widely varied attitudes, tastes, and religious convictions, their other needs, and the 
necessarily limited resources at their disposal . . . .’” (quoting C.C. Havighurst, Controlling 
Health Care Costs, 1 J. Health Pol., Pol’y & L., 471, 491 (1977))). Imagine evaluating 
whether or not a particular legal rule is an attractive legal rule for a benefit bargain. A 
defined benefit pension promise is very different than a health insurance promise. The 
substantive ways in which the parties may fail to understand the terms differ; the promise 
length differs; the opportunities for incompetent, strategic, or malicious behavior differ; 
the interpretive ambiguity of the core bargain term differs, e.g., a precise mathematical 
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 The Supreme Court, however, has interpreted ERISA this way, and 
thus done exactly the wrong thing when it comes to making benefit 
rules: it has been largely indifferent to context.196 That is unlikely to 
result in ideal legal rules. Instead it virtually guarantees square pegs for 
round holes.197 
 The problem is made more complicated in that the selection of an 
optimal legal rule in a benefit setting need not only consider the effect 
of alternate rules, but also the possibility of alternate benefit settings 
entirely. That last part requires some explanation. Let us assume that, in 
fact, a particular legal rule will be so costly or volatile that it will reduce 
the frequency or generosity of employment-based benefit bargains of a par-
ticular type. So what? Employment-based benefit bargains are not an 
end in and of themselves; they are a means to provide for retirement 
and health care. The ultimate cost associated with fewer or less generous 
employment benefit bargains is measured by looking at the extent to 
which workers not receiving employee benefits will not obtain health 
insurance or retirement income as cheaply, or at all, some other way. 
Health insurance provides a useful practical illustration of this point. It 
                                                                                                                      
formula compared to a broad promise to provide “medically necessary care”; the fitness of 
a judge to resolve disputes differs; and the nature and magnitude of the consequences to 
the beneficiary in the case of breach differ. There is little if any reason to believe the opti-
mal legal rules across those circumstances will or should be the same. See Maher & Stris, 
supra note 9, at 467–73. Even within the category of health bargains, rule optimality would 
need to consider heterogeneity of substantive preference. Cf. Blumstein & Zubkoff, supra 
note 6, at 401. 
196 See, e.g., Lockheed, 517 U.S. at 890–91 (applying the settler doctrine in the pension 
setting without serious explanation of its reasoning); Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. at 81–82 
(same, in the welfare setting). The Court has also ignored context in determining the 
rules of review and remedy. See, e.g., Glenn, 554 U.S. at 105, 113 (ignoring the rules of re-
view). No statutory provision speaks to the settlor doctrines or the standard of review, so 
the Court was and is free to make law as it sees fit. Regarding remedies, the “benefits” re-
medy refers to “rights,” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006); the “fiduciary” remedy to “re-
medial” and “appropriate” relief, id. §§ 1109, 1132(a)(2); and the “catch-all” remedy refers 
to “appropriate equitable relief,” id. § 1132(a)(3). An extended textual analysis is not nec-
essary to see that the provisions are nearly as pliable as a context-sensitive Court might 
want them to be. In any event, were the Court in fact confined by text, the objection would 
still have force against Congress. Ultimately it does not matter. The problem is that the 
rules are difficult to pick, and the right rules are too likely to be different for different 
players. The answer is not that Congress should have given clearer instruction to the 
courts. The answer is that Congress should reduce the importance of both its and the 
courts’ judgments. 
197 The point is that ERISA, reposing as it does so much authority in federal rule-
makers, does not provide an opportunity for any natural corrective. Thus, when federal 
judges develop square-peg-for-round-hole rules, effectively no force other than Congress 
can address that mistake. Opt-in federalism, in contrast, provides competitive pressure, as 
well as an exit option if competitive pressure fails to improve a given rule. 
2011] The Benefits of Opt-in Federalism 1769 
is difficult for many individuals to obtain health insurance outside the 
workplace.198 
 In any insurance promise, the expected cost is a function of the 
likelihood a given insured will experience a loss event and the size of 
the expected loss.199 The higher this expected cost, the higher the ac-
tuarially fair premium an insurer must charge to be profitable.200 But if 
the insurer offers too high a premium, many potential insureds will be 
dissuaded from purchasing policies.201 Health insurance is attractive to 
insureds to the extent it reflects an actuarially fair premium plus some 
cost increment reflecting the insured’s level of risk-aversion.202 
 One method for an insurer to charge the appropriate premium is 
to “rate” insureds correctly.203 Insureds that are higher rated for risk are 
either (1) not offered insurance at all or (2) offered insurance with an 
increased premium, relative to the average-rated insured.204 The effect 
is that some people will be not offered insurance at any price in an un-
regulated market, whereas others will be offered insurance at a price 
they cannot afford.205 Precise rating is difficult.206 Information asym-
metries can result in adverse selection, where an insurer knows less 
about the true riskiness of the potential insured than does the insured, 
and a premium not reflective of the true expected cost of the insured is 
offered and accepted.207 The result is that in the next round of pre-
mium calculation, the premiums increase, and for healthier people, 
the insurance deal becomes financially unattractive.208 When healthy 
people leave the pool, this departure increases the expected payout per 
person, which results in higher premiums, which exacerbates the prob-
                                                                                                                      
198 See Diamond, supra note 73, at 1236–37 (explaining that in the small group and in-
dividual markets, individuals considered high risk may either be rejected for coverage or 
may only obtain coverage at premiums they cannot afford). 
199 Santerre & Neun, supra note 65, at 148–54 (discussing the insurance calculus). 
200 See id. at 149. 
201 See id. 
202 See Arrow, supra note 66, at 959–61. 
203 In the individual insurance market, this is achievable through the underwriting 
process, which occurs at the inception and renewal of the insurance contract. See Dia-
mond, supra note 73, at 1237. Underwriting is where the insurer gathers information re-
garding the risk profile of the potential insured and rates the insured accordingly. See 
Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 32. 
204 See Diamond, supra note 73, at 1237. 
205 See id. 
206 See Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy 311–13 (2005). 
207 Id. (explaining adverse selection). See generally Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 
90 Q.J. Economics 629 (1976) (offering the theory of adverse selection). 
208 See Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 32. 
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lem, and so on.209 Severe adverse selection problems can destroy or 
wildly distort insurance markets, and require government interven-
on
 imperils the functioning of the individual health insurance 
ar
de promises will not obtain 
su
receive retirement or health benefits at work may be unlikely to secure 
                                                                                                                     
ti .210 
 Adverse selection risks decline to the extent an insurer can insure 
a group bound together by some commonality other than an interest in 
obtaining health insurance—for example, the same employer, the same 
geographical region, or the same church.211 Thus employment-based 
health insurance is useful because, by aggregating people for reasons 
unrelated to health status, it ameliorates the problem of adverse selec-
tion, which
m ket.212 
 Accordingly, in selecting optimal legal rules in the employment 
benefit context, one must consider alternative benefit possibilities. To 
the extent the individual market is afflicted by adverse selection distor-
tions, imposing legal rules that discourage employers from offering in-
surance can potentially have a very steep downside.213 If an employer 
chooses to not offer health insurance because of costly or uncertain 
legal rules, the consequence could be that some of the people who 
would have been beneficiaries of such unma
in rance at all on the individual market.214 
 Besides adverse selection,215 other obstacles to securing benefits 
outside of employment bargains exist. There are several reasons—many 
identified in behavioral economic literature—why workers who do not 
 
209 See Gruber, supra note 206, at 312 (noting that less risky individuals are more likely 
to seek lower insurance coverage than risky individuals). 
210 The degree to which adverse selection manifests itself in practice is contested. See, 
e.g., Gruber, supra note 5, at 577 (noting there is “mixed” evidence on the degree to which 
those who choose to be insured are “adversely selected”). For a clear treatment of the top-
ic, see generally Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated 
Threat, 113 Yale L.J. 1223 (2004). 
211 See Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 32. 
212 See Allison Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets, 
and Health Reform, 36 Am. J.L. & Med. 7, 28 (2010) (“Insurers have little concern of adverse 
selection with respect to large, employer-sponsored group insurance.”). 
213 See id. (discussing adverse selection). 
214 See Diamond, supra note 73, at 1237. But cf. Siegelman supra note 210, at 1231 & 
n.26 (challenging the strength of the argument that adverse selection concerns support 
narrowing liability standards). 
215 See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 5, at 574, 577 (noting that the nongroup insurance 
market “has not provided a very hospitable environment” and that the high cost of health 
insurance is a large reason for uninsurance). A milder form of adverse selection is thought 
to exist in the pension context. See Feldstein, supra note 36, at 8 (discussing adverse selec-
tion in individual annuity markets). 
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such benefits through alternate arrangements.216 These complications 
make even more difficult the appropriate weighing of considerations 
when selecting benefit rules in different contexts. 
 Given the complexities of the marginal costs and advantages of 
various legal rules, the difference in those valuations across contexts, 
and the comparative difficulties associated with securing benefits 
through other means, it is likely, if not certain, that federal judges are 
not best suited to this task.217 
 I do not mean to suggest that choosing optimal legal rules is easy. 
To the contrary, it is quite difficult for any actor. It involves complicated 
judgments regarding what data to collect and rely on, what assumptions 
should govern in the absence of data, and which subjects of the rules 
are best suited to bear what levels of risk. Optimal benefit rules are not 
easily determined. Confidence regarding the rightness of a particular 
rule selection is modest at best.218 In addition, different rules might be 
optimal given the preferences of different individuals or groups. Pref-
erences for cost and security vary; preference for legal rules will vary 
accordingly.219 
 Selecting optimal legal rules regarding retirement and health care 
bargains necessarily implicates textured, varying, and challenging pol-
icy questions.220 Divergent preferences increase the challenge, dimin-
ishing the appeal of a centralized mechanism for answering those ques-
                                                                                                                      
216 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. See generally Edward J. McCaffery, Comments 
on Liebman and Zeckhauser, Simple Humans, Complex Insurance, Subtle Subsidies (U.S.C. 
Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 81, 2008), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcon- 
tent.cgi?article=1085&context=usclwps (discussing cognitive biases in the health insurance 
context). 
217 Cf. Stein, supra note 93, at 110 (arguing that courts are “poorly suited” to answer 
questions ERISA left unanswered). 
218 The more uncertain and challenging rule selection is, vesting authority in a single 
decision-maker becomes less appealing. Additional trials, e.g., other rule-makers, become 
more appealing. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1543, 
1546 (2008) (noting that “the persistence of a practice across many minds . . . makes it 
more likely to be correct, wise, or good”). More generally, in many settings, aggregative 
reasoning can be helpful to an observer attempting to determine the “right” answer, al-
though it has limits. Cf. id. at 1550–52 (discussing aggregative approaches in assessing the 
wisdom of legal rules). 
219 Nor is the claim of varying preference inconsistent with the observation that con-
siderable uncertainty plagues the task of identifying an optimal rule. Uncertainty around 
optimality does not mean that for Group A the cloud of uncertainty does not hover in a 
different place than it does for Group B. Imagine there are ten possible rules: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9, 10. If the average uncertainty surrounding a preference is one, then if Group A 
prefers Rule 2 and Group B prefers Rule 9, even though uncertainty clouds each group’s 
preferences, it is clear the Groups prefer different rules. 
220 See Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 435. 
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tions. Such perfectly describes ERISA.221 The conclusion, then, is not 
simply that the Court has gotten the answers wrong, although it likely 
has. The conclusion is that ERISA, a rigidly centralized statute, has 
structural infirmities that one would expect to, and in fact do, frustrate 
the search for optimal benefit law. This is true not only regarding the 
law ERISA affirmatively produced, but also regarding the law it 
blocked—state law.222 The following Part considers a more promising 
approach. 
III. Improving Bargain Law with “Opt-in Federalism” 
 Law can specify not only substantive rules, but also who chooses 
them. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) offers a 
novel and conceptually fascinating approach regarding who makes and 
chooses law: “opt-in federalism.” Fusing individual autonomy with de-
centralization, it is truly twenty-first-century federalism, and has far 
reaching implications. 
 Using a federalist lens, the ACA can be thought of as exercising 
federal power in two distinct ways. The first way is a classic (if constitu-
tionally challenged) exercise of federal power—direct federal rulemak-
ing:223 the ACA specifies that all or certain health insurance bargains in 
the country satisfy particular federal requirements.224 The best exam-
ples of this are the ACA’s commands that certain policies provide speci-
fied minimum coverage.225 Minimum coverage requirements may be 
complicated or unwise, but theoretically, they are akin to the federal 
                                                                                                                      
221 Nor does it bear the usual advantage of centralized action: the guarantee of a min-
imum to everyone. ERISA does not guarantee any promises get made. 
222 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
223 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022 (West Supp. 2011) (establishing minimum coverage 
requirements); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-11(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (prohibiting limits on 
lifetime or annual coverage). How one categorizes this direct rulemaking—whether as an 
instance of “preemptive” or “cooperative” federalism, or something else, see infra note 
256—is an interesting question that deserves attention, but that is not my aim here. The 
opt-in federalism element of the statute is more novel. I focus on that and the unexplored 
potential it poses for resolving difficult and divisive questions of law and policy regarding 
health care and retirement. Cf. generally Kenneth Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of 
Competition in Regulation, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1977) (discussing the choice made by banks 
with respect to federal or state charters). But see Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Insurance Sales 
or Selling Insurance Regulation?: Against Regulatory Competition in Insurance, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 
1707, 1721 (2010) (discussing and criticizing reform proposals calling for increased regu-
latory choice by insurers in life, property, and casualty markets). 
224 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022. 
225 Id. (specifying what package of services need be covered by the policy). Another 
example of direct rulemaking is the prohibition on lifetime or annual coverage limits for 
all policies sold. See id. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-11(a). 
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government stepping into the shoes of every state government and an-
nouncing the rules. 
 The other way in which the ACA exercises federal power is quite 
different. It is not direct rulemaking. The ACA uses federal power to 
create a legal meta-structure in which individuals can plausibly “opt-in” 
to either federal (specifically ERISA) or state law governing their health 
bargains.226 In exercising federal power to create this choice-of-law 
structure, the federal government is explicitly not making substantive 
law. 
 In theoretical terms, a legal structure of “opt-in federalism” pre-
sents considerable appeal. Because of the way in which it melds indi-
vidual, state, and federal roles, it seems more likely than any other to 
optimize benefit law. Put another way, it is most likely to maximize the 
chance that the nation collectively, and citizens individually, will have 
access to the most desirable body of law regarding the private provision 
of health insurance (and perhaps retirement income). The chief irony, 
perhaps, is that although the ACA forces people to make bargains,227 it 
bespeaks a legal structure that can accommodate more individual 
choice in governing law—as well as more effective say from the states— 
than was the case before the ACA. 
A. ACA and Opt-in Federalism 
 One of the ACA’s many aims was to make health insurance avail-
able to all.228 It does so in part by using federal power to address prob-
lems in individual health insurance markets. Specifically, the ACA limits 
the permissible scope of underwriting, abolishes the preexisting condi-
tion exclusion, and imposes an individual mandate requiring all indi-
viduals to have health insurance or pay a penalty.229 
                                                                                                                      
226 See infra notes 228–252 and accompanying text. It bears emphasizing that this ap-
plies to only the parts of bargains that are not governed directly by ACA. See infra notes 
228–252 and accompanying text. 
227 One can conceive of an opt-in system without a federal mandate that individuals 
buy insurance; a mandate is one mechanism that opens up individual markets. 
228 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091 (West Supp. 2011). 
229 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (specifying rating factors); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300gg-1 (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (guaranteed availability); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-2 (West 
2003 & Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2014) (guaranteed renewability); 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 300gg-3 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2014, except effective immediately 
for enrollees under 19) (prohibition against preexisting condition exclusion); 26 U.S.C.A. 
§ 5000A (West 2011) (mandate) (effective Jan. 1, 2014). 
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 These three reforms are targeted at ameliorating the adverse selec-
tion problem that can destroy or severely hamper individual markets.230 
From this perspective, the ACA is a hyper-form of the benefit as bargain 
model.231 It aims to achieve universal coverage by using federal power to 
make bargains realistically possible for those outside the group market. 
Importantly, however, the ACA does not limit participation in the indi-
vidual market it functionally creates to only those who do not have or 
cannot get health insurance through their employer.232 Individuals who 
wish to obtain insurance other than group insurance offered by their 
employer may do so.233 The consequences of this bear examination. 
 Recall that there are effectively two markets for health insurance— 
the group market and the individual market.234 They were (and are) 
governed by different legal regimes. As I have emphasized, employ-
ment-based insurance dominates the group market.235 The legal rules 
governing employment-based health insurance are in the main federal 
rules, with state regulatory discretion limited under ERISA’s preemp-
tive scope.236 Much of the relevant federal rules are judge-made and 
have attracted considerable criticism.237 In contrast, in the individual 
                                                                                                                      
230 If every person is required to obtain insurance, the peril of adverse selection is vast-
ly diminished; there is little need for risk underwriting or preexisting condition exclusions. 
See supra notes 203–210 and accompanying text. Congress specifically found that the man-
date “is essential to creating effective health insurance markets in which improved health 
insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of preexisting 
conditions can be sold.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I) (West Supp. 2011); cf. Amitabh 
Chandra, Jonathan Gruber & Robin McKnight, The Importance of the Individual Mandate—
Evidence from Massachusetts, 364 New Eng. J. Medicine 293, 293–95 (2011) (explaining 
reduction in premiums in Massachusetts after instantiation of the mandate). 
231 See supra notes 47–75 and accompanying text (discussing benefits as bargains). 
232 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a)(1); see also Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will 
Employers Undermine Health Care by Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 Va. L. Rev. 125, 154–55 
(2011). 
233 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a)(1). 
234 See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 73, at 1237–38 (discussing the large and small group 
markets, and noting that the small group market is much like the individual market); see 
also Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 30–35 (discussing the comparative advantages of em-
ployer-based insurance, or group insurance, compared to individual employee insurance). 
This is a bit of an oversimplification, given the peculiarities of small-group markets. For my 
purposes, it does not matter. 
235 See supra notes 91–222 and accompanying text. 
236 See supra notes 91–222 and accompanying text. State regulation exists, of course. 
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2006) (allowing states to regulate insurance). But its 
application is limited by ERISA and the small nature of the individual market. See Gruber, 
supra note 5, at 573 (explaining that employer-based insurance dominates the private in-
surance market). 
237 See supra notes 47–75 and accompanying text. 
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market, regulation in the main is state-based.238 Because of problems of 
adverse selection, however, as well as other obstacles, the individual 
market is not accessible to many people.239 
 Employment-based group insurance is largely governed by the 
federal law of ERISA.240 In contrast, individual ACA policies will be 
health insurance policies that are in significant part governed by state 
law.241 The effect of the ACA can thus be summarized as follows: it en-
acts rules that provide a federal core for health insurance policies sold 
in the country;242 it enacts rules that revitalize the moribund individual 
insurance market;243 and in determining the legal rules governing 
                                                                                                                      
238 See Amy B. Monahan, Initial Thoughts on Essential Health Benefits, in 1 New York 
University Review of Employee Benefits and Executive Compensation, supra note 
57, at 1B-1, 1B-2. 
239 See Gruber, supra note 5, at 575 (observing that for less healthy people, it is almost 
impossible to obtain complete coverage); Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 32 (observing 
that adverse selection could destroy the insurance market altogether, when unalleviated by 
things such as employment-based insurance). 
240 See Monahan, supra note 238, at 1B-3; see also supra notes 121–127. 
241 See id. 
242 The scope of ACA’s “federal core” is not straightforward. Different core federal re-
quirements govern individual policies as opposed to those that govern group policies. 
Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-11 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (both group and individual 
policies may not impose lifetime or annual caps), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 18021(b)(1)(B) (West 
Supp. 2011) (providing that the minimum coverage requirements for “qualified health 
plans” do not cover “a group health plan or multiple employer welfare arrangement to the 
extent the plan or arrangement is not subject to State insurance regulation under [ER-
ISA]”). An excellent initial analysis of the fluctuating nature of the applicable “core” fed-
eral coverage was done by Professors Monahan and Schwarcz. See Monahan & Schwarcz, 
supra note 232, at 146–51. 
My task is entirely different. Certainly, determining the size of the “direct” rulemaking 
aspect of a federal statute—which in ACA I am calling the federal “core,” or cores, to the 
extent the core varies across contexts—is necessary to assess the degree to which an opt-in 
federalist structure exists in a given statute. The idea of this Article is that foundational 
analysis needs to be done as to why opt-in federalism might be desirable at all, and to pose 
questions regarding what categories of rule or policies opt-in federalism might be appro-
priate for. The answer to that can be used to evaluate whether ACA has struck the right 
balance in its actual division of authority. 
243 See supra note 230 and accompanying text. ACA also establishes “exchanges.” See 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 18031–18033, 18041–18044 (West Supp. 2011). Exchanges “will provide a 
point of access for people to comparison shop among individual and small group health 
insurance offerings.” Sidney D. Watson, Mending the Fabric of Small Town America: Health 
Reform and Rural Economics, 113 W. Va. L. Rev. 1, 24 (2010). Millions of people are ex-
pected to use the exchanges. See, e.g., Congressional Budget Office, supra note 19, at 23 
tbl.4 (projecting 24 million people will obtain coverage through exchanges); Richard S. 
Foster, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Estimated Financial Effects of the “Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” as Amended 4 (2010), available at 
https://www.cms.gov/ActuarialStudies/Downloads/PPACA_2010–04–22.pdf (estimating 
that 16 million individuals will be covered through exchanges). Insurance can be pur-
chased outside of the exchanges. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18071 (West Supp. 2011). 
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health insurance (other than the federal core regulations), the ACA 
uses ERISA for group policies and state law for individual policies.244 
 This legal structure creates the possibility for opt-in federalism.245 
Although all health insurance bargains now have a federal core com-
ponent, the ACA’s creation of an alternative individual health market 
reasonably accessible to individuals allows individuals to choose be-
tween striking bargains governed by the ACA and ERISA or, alterna-
tively, by the ACA and state law. 246 
 The most salient example is the law of remedy under the ACA. In-
dividuals, in short, can opt-out of ERISA and its passel of constrictive 
                                                                                                                      
244 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-23 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (preserving state authority to re-
gulate insurance to the extent such does not “prevent” the application of an ACA re-
quirement); 42 U.S.C.A. § 18041(d) (West Supp. 2011) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed to preempt any State law that does not prevent the application of the provisions 
of this chapter.”). ACA provides no remedies, and thus the remedies available to a pur-
chaser of individual insurance in the case of wrongfully denied coverage would be those of 
state law. 
245 There are certainly practical obstacles to choice, in the form of lost employer con-
tributions or different tax treatment, that are not trivial. See, e.g., Monahan & Schwarcz, 
supra note 242, at 155, 170–71. That is a fact of practical rather than theoretical impor-
tance. If opt-in federalism is conceptually appealing, then that justifies making policy 
changes to truly level the options. Additional legislation, for example, could require em-
ployers’ contributions to be portable and/or level tax treatment regarding individual in-
surance purchases. Moreover, worker preferences may result in employers, in response to 
labor pressures, constructing benefit regimes that enable insurance choice through health 
reimbursement arrangements. See, e.g., id. at 160-61 (discussing means by which employers 
can enable choice but expressing concern over the consequences). 
I note again a more general point: the aim of this Article is to consider whether “opt-
in federalism” is an appealing theoretical mechanism to make and choose benefit law, not 
whether ACA does a particularly good job of instantiating an opt-in federalist approach. 
ACA admits of opt-in federalism, but may botch the specifics, and I do not pretend other-
wise. Of course, specifics matter. What legal rules should come directly from the federal 
government in the form of “direct rulemaking” and what legal rules should be in the “opt-
in space” is no small issue; whether ACA struck the right balance there is a matter unto 
itself. Ensuring that individuals have true options regarding whatever categories of legal 
rules are in the opt-in space is yet another issue that requires separate treatment. More-
over, permitting choice regarding some legal rules may present risk-classification problems 
(because of employer gaming or otherwise) or face cognitive hurdles. The answer to such 
thorny practical issues will depend on the content of the legal rules being chosen and will 
inform the means by which we might address the foregoing concerns. 
246 The statute is neither a model of clarity in its particulars or simplicity in the inter-
locking nature of its scheme. It may be that different interpretations of portions of the 
statute, or of collective portions, threaten the reality of opt-in federalism in ACA. That is 
not my view, but it is not impossible; no one, for example, would have predicted how the 
Supreme Court construed ERISA. See supra notes 130–179 and accompanying text. Such 
does little to undermine my point, however: ACA admits the possibility of opt-in federal-
ism, and it is that possibility we should keep in mind both when assessing (or even adjudg-
ing) ACA and imagining future reforms moving forward. 
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judge-made rules.247 A citizen living in State X who receives group in-
surance through his employer will be party to a bargain that is governed 
by the ACA in terms of its core requirements and by the federal law of 
ERISA for remedy.248 If that same citizen chooses to purchase a policy 
on the ACA individual market, that person will be subject to the ACA’s 
core rules but state rules of remedy.249 The ACA permits individuals to 
opt for the source of legal rules—federal or state—governing bargains 
they strike. If they choose employment insurance, they are choosing 
federal rules.250 If they choose individual insurance, they are choosing 
state rules251—hence the term “opt-in federalism.”252 
                                                                                                                     
B. The Appeal of Opt-in Federalism 
 Some legal rules directly govern everyday conduct, such as rules of 
negligence. Other legal rules do not directly regulate conduct, but in-
stead regulate who has the power to make legal rules. A convenient if 
imperfect shorthand might be to label the former “rules of law” and the 
latter “rules of power.” Rules of power specify who can make rules of 
law.253 
 Rules of power can train themselves along different divisions of 
authority. Federalism, for example, is rule of power theory that seeks to 
desirably allocate power between national and local governments, i.e., a 
 
247 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a) (West Supp. 2011). 
248 See id. § 18032(a); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(2), (a)(3)(B) (2006). 
249 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a). 
250 See 29 § 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(2), (a)(3)(B) (2006); supra note 244 and accompanying 
text. I have presumed here that in the case where an employer purchases a policy from a 
state “exchange” and offers it to employees, the remedies available to an employee are 
ERISA remedies, not state law remedies. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(2), (a)(3)(B). 
See generally Monahan, supra note 238, at 1B-2 to -3 (discussing the triggered sources of law 
in different employment scenarios). Were that not the case, it would simply lessen the 
number of people with an option. 
251 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a); Monahan, supra note 238, at 1B-2. 
252 See id. Nor obviously is opt-in federalism, as a theoretical approach, limited to rules 
of remedy. It can apply to all types of legal rules—notice, procedure, duty, construction, 
presumption, and so on. 
253 One immediately thinks of H.L.A. Hart’s distinction between “primary” obligation-
imposing rules and “secondary” rules of power. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 
77–96 (1961); see also Neil MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart 35 (1981) (discussing Hart’s “rules 
of obligation” and “power-conferring” rules). I use my informal “rule of law” and “rule of 
power” distinction not as a commentary on what law is, but merely as an argumentative 
device to help explain the work the opt-in federalism part of ACA does, namely, increasing 
the roles individuals and states play in making and choosing law. 
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power allocation between sovereigns.254 Separation of powers is a rule 
of power theory that seeks to allocate power among different depart-
ments within a government, i.e., power allocation within a sovereign.255 
 Rules of power need not be mutually exclusive.256 The functional 
sharing of lawmaking or enforcement authority between sovereigns or 
within sovereigns is obviously a form of power allocation.257 In modern 
arrangements, frequently power is shared, with the background formal 
rules of power specifying (with varying degrees of clarity) that one 
lawmaker must defer to the other when there is conflict in a specified 
area, but with cooperation sought and conflict avoided as much as pos-
                                                                                                                      
254 This is true whether one conceives of the power of the inferior sovereign to be 
rooted in de jure or de facto autonomy. Cf. Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the 
Way Down, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 7 (2010) (discussing the conflict between courts and scho-
lars). There is a nearly endless amount of literature describing, attacking, or defining what 
“federalism” does or should mean in modern times. Cf. Davis, supra note 5, at 216 (noting 
that “[i]f there are now ten ways of looking at the subject [of federalism], how many more 
will there be by the year 4000 A.D.?”). Of course “federalism” can conceivably cover, and 
historically has described, many very different arrangements. See, e.g., id. at 2 (“If we wish 
to come to terms with this political concept, we must come to terms with its history . . . .”). 
See generally Alison L. LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism 
(2010) (illustrating a recent and engaging treatment of the life and times of American 
federalism). In any event, I use “federalism” here in the broadest, most functional sense of 
the term: as a description of a system in which national and subnational governments each 
play some material policymaking role in a given field. 
255 The famous Erie doctrine operates along both federalist and separation of power 
dimensions, attempting to chart out when federal procedural law displaces state law, and 
calibrating the answer based on whether the federal rules were instantiated by the federal 
legislature or the federal bench. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); 
Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady 
Grove, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 17, 25–26 (2010) (noting that in the Erie context “the allocation 
of lawmaking power between the federal government and the States depends on the 
source of federal lawmaking power”). 
256 A sensible categorization of federalist approaches, in descending order of federal 
power, can be thought of as “preemptive federalism,” “cooperative federalism,” and “dual 
federalism.” See Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforce-
ment of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1692, 1693 (2001) [hereinafter Weiser, Federal 
Common Law] (discussing variants of federalism). Preemptive federalism is what it sounds 
like. See id. Cooperative federalism envisions federal and state authority working in tandem 
to design optimal rules, as opposed to “dual federalism,” in which separate spheres of au-
thority exist. See Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federal-
ism, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 663, 665, 671 (2001) [hereinafter Weiser, Cooperative Federalism] (dis-
cussing cooperative federalism); see also Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 
Va. L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (1950) (describing dual federalism and its diminished fortunes in the 
aftermath of the New Deal and World War II); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of 
Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 
Mich. L. Rev. 813, 815–17 (1998) (discussing cooperative and dual federalism). 
257 See, e.g., Weiser, Federal Common Law, supra note 256, at 1693. 
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sible.258 Agency deference is a rule of power theory that seeks to coop-
eratively share power within a sovereign, i.e., between courts and agen-
cies (although it can also happen across sovereigns).259 
 Opt-in federalism is an innovative and intriguing way to allocate 
power. The core intuition is that, with respect to important particulars 
of the health insurance bargain, federal and state sovereigns have paral-
lel rulemaking power. Respective sovereigns’ bodies of law are triggered 
to the extent that an individual opts-in to that body of law; choice and 
federalism are fused. The theoretical appeal of such an arrangement— 
as framed but certainly not perfectly embodied by the ACA—is mani-
fold, as the following Sections examine below.260 
1. Preferences 
 First, opt-in federalism increases the likelihood that individual pre-
ferences regarding rules of law will be realized.261 To the extent an in-
dividual can freely choose from various policies available on the ACA 
individual market, rather than accept the ERISA insurance policy of-
fered by his employer, the chances for preference maximization in-
crease.262 Unlike traditional federalism, where the individual must 
move between states to take advantage of different rules,263 opt-in fed-
                                                                                                                      
 
258 See, e.g., Weiser, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 256, at 665. 
259 Cf. Weiser, Federal Common Law, supra note 256, at 1768 (describing modern federal-
ism as using “federal courts as advisors to and watchdogs over federal regulatory agencies, 
state agencies, and Congress, more than as direct lawmaking authorities”). 
260 The following caveat bears considerable emphasis. For theoretical and expository 
clarity, I use an “idealized” ACA as a frame to present the idea, and potential appeal, of 
opt-in federalism. That is, I imagine ACA as setting up a legal structure where individuals 
can tax-neutrally, see supra note 78, obtain insurance through their employer or via the 
individual market; where certain aspects of the insurance promise are governed by ACA, 
whether obtained through the employer or via the individual market; and where other, 
significant aspects of the insurance bargain are governed either by ERISA or state law. See 
42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a)(1) (West Supp. 2011); Monahan, supra note 238, at 1B-2 to -3. That 
ACA is not a platonic form of opt-in federalism (particularly in terms of tax; it is not tax-
neutral) is conceded but of minor theoretical concern. See supra note 245 and accompany-
ing text. This Article, in short, is about opt-in federalism, not the extent to which ACA 
obstructs the innovative structure it contemplates. 
261 It also, obviously, allows insureds to comparison shop along other metrics, although 
such is limited by federal requirements. I focus on choice of law. 
262 Such is obviously not so to the extent state law exactly mirrors ERISA law. No state’s 
law does. 
263 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416, 
418–23 (1956) (evaluating the possibility of exiting a jurisdiction which has an undesirable 
rule and the consequences on rule evolution); see also Paul E. Peterson, The Price of 
Federalism 18 (1995) (noting that local governments must be responsive to the needs of 
local businesses and residents, or residents will relocate); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. 
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eralism permits a far less costly manner of expressing one’s prefer-
ence.264 Admittedly, the choice is only between the law of State X and 
ERISA,265 but the expression of such choice does not require reloca-
tion, which no doubt poses a considerable obstacle to choice.266 
 “Traditional” federalism, of course, theoretically gave any potential 
insured the horizontal “vote with the feet” choice between the law of 
State X and State Y.267 But the ACA in principle increases the traditional 
federalist option because it creates in every state an individual market 
that is by law open to any of that state’s residents.268 In the past, individ-
ual underwriting and pre-existing exclusions effectively destroyed the 
possibility of horizontal choice among certain insureds.269 Some people, 
even if they had moved to a particular state, simply could not bargain 
                                                                                                                      
Rubinfeld, The Political Economy of Federalism, in Perspectives on Public Choice: A Hand-
book 73, 83–85 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997) (discussing, in economic terms, that overall 
market and social efficiency in a federalist model relies on the ability of citizens to relocate 
without cost); Wallace E. Oates, On Local Finance and the Tiebout Model, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 
93, 95–97 (1981) (discussing the work of Charles Tiebout). 
264 Cf. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 
41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 919–20 (1994) (favoring options within “a national, decentralized 
program”). In that same article, Professors Rubin and Feeley attempted to distinguish the 
virtues of “federalism” from mere “decentralization.” See generally id. To oversimplify, their 
argument was that “federalism” is undesirable to the extent it means anything more than 
“decentralization,” an organizational concept that they argued was, on balance, attractive. 
See id. at 908–09. Their argument has been criticized in various ways. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jack-
son, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 2180, 
2183 (1998) (offering multiple criticisms). Although this distinction may be quite impor-
tant elsewhere—particularly regarding the appropriate judicial posture towards “federal-
ism” —I think for my purposes, labels matter less than does a functional assessment of the 
legal choice structure ACA arguably creates. 
265 Because the individual states regulate insurance, consumers cannot purchase insur-
ance “across state lines” to avail themselves of the rules of another state. See Walter W. 
Heiser, Due Process Limitations on Pre-Answer Security Requirements for Nonresident Unlicensed 
Issuers, 88 Neb. L. Rev. 494, 496 (2010) (“Each state has the power to regulate insurance 
companies who conduct business within the state’s boundaries.”). 
266 See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Charles J. Goetz, Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility: An 
Assessment of the Tiebout Model, 1 J. Pub. Econ. 25, 26–39 (1972) (examining cost and likeli-
hood of movement); Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation 
in Decentralized Governments, 58 Emory L.J. 1333, 1366 (2009) (questioning whether, in a 
federalism analysis, the costs of relocation are worth the purported efficiency gains); Brian 
D. Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System 49–69 (FSU College of Law, Public Law 
Research Paper No. 394, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1473107(discussing, 
in Part IV, how relocation costs are significant and can undermine notions of competitive 
federalism). 
267 See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
268 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a)(1) (West Supp. 2011). 
269 Cf. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201, 124 
Stat. 119, 154–61 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 to -7) (promoting nondis-
crimination in health care coverage). 
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their way into the markets in which that state’s law (as opposed to ER-
ISA) governed, and thus did not have true horizontal choice.270 The 
ACA improves horizontal as well as vertical choice, and in both ways in-
creases the likelihood that individual preferences will be satisfied.271 
 Moreover, those who remain subject to ERISA’s constrictive rules— 
to the extent their state offers a different regime—have agreed to be 
governed by ERISA rules.272 There is a marked difference between a 
world where there is no realistic choice other than to live under a fed-
eral regime where judges assumed policymaking roles outside their in-
stitutional competence273 and a world where one can, if one so chooses, 
opt-in to such a regime because the content of those judge-made rules 
are nonetheless appealing. ERISA supplies us the former;274 the ACA 
makes possible the latter.275 
 In the broadest terms, the refuge of an alternative is deeply satisfy-
ing. Although we all accept that we must be governed by law, we are 
continually troubled that the law might be “wrong,” in two senses. The 
first is that the law does not actually reflect the preference of the major-
ity (or the command of some constitutional document that supersedes 
the majority will), but is instead the law of a legislature unduly influ-
enced by special interests or made by rogue judges.276 The second is 
that the law very well might reflect the majority preference or some 
constitutional command, but it does not reflect our personal prefer-
ence. In either case the solace of another sovereign is appealing, and 
being able to opt-in at little cost is more appealing still. It is vastly easier 
than attempting to change the original sovereign’s rule (either by de-
mocratic or judicial means, or by insurrection) or to escape the rule by 
physically leaving the sovereign’s dominion. The last two are quite diffi-
cult, and thus in reality people faced with undesirable rules simply ac-
cept them; we all intuitively know this, and thus all intuitively appreci-
ate the power of an easily exercisable option. 
                                                                                                                      
270 See Gruber, supra note 5, at 574 (noting the difficulty of obtaining coverage in the 
nongroup market). 
271 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a)(1) (West Supp. 2011). 
272 See id. 
273 See supra notes 130–179 and accompanying text. 
274 See supra notes 130–179 and accompanying text. 
275 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a)(1). 
276 See, e.g., supra notes 180–189 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretations of ERISA for running counter to Congress’s intent). 
But see note 245 (discussing hurdles to choice under the ACA). 
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2. States 
 The ACA restores to the states a significant measure of regulatory 
power that vanished during ERISA’s reign.277 ERISA’s preemptive pow-
er, by definition, emanates from the regulation of employee benefit 
plans.278 In practice, ERISA granted an outsized role to federal regula-
tion of health insurance because the majority of private health insur-
ance in the United States was delivered through employee benefit 
plans.279 The ACA sidesteps the issue by in effect setting up a plausible 
alternative system of insurance that exists outside of employee benefit 
plans.280 To be sure, while ACA insurance is subject to core federal re-
quirements, important law governing the bargain is a matter of state 
law. Remedies are the clearest example.281 
 Such power is wisely vested in state authorities, on the classic ra-
tionale that they are more aware of and responsive to local preferences 
of constituents.282 In other words, they are more likely to discern the 
preferences of citizens than a national government that is literally and 
proverbially farther away.283 In addition, local rule is more accommo-
dating to regional diversity of preference; some states’ citizens may, as a 
body, simply prefer one set of legal rules over another.284 Both Califor-
nians and Texans are likely to prefer a regime where their state gov-
ernments get to craft significant portions of law in a way consistent with 
                                                                                                                      
277 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a)(1); supra notes 130–222 and accompanying text. 
278 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
279 See id.; supra notes 96–129 and accompanying text (discussing the predominant role 
of the federal government under ERISA). 
280 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a)(1). 
281 See supra notes 228–252 and accompanying text. 
282 See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 254, at 7 (describing the asserted virtues of federalism 
as “choice, competition, experimentation, and the diffusion of power”); Stewart, supra 
note 181, at 917–18 (describing various rationales in favor of federalism). In American law 
“the basic assumption is that states have authority to regulate their own citizens and terri-
tory.” Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 469 
(1989). 
There are constitutional arguments in favor of federalism “even if one could prove 
that federalism secured no advantages to anyone.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
157 (1992); see also John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1311, 
1357–91 (1997) (arguing that the Constitution envisions the judiciary policing the power 
allocations of federalism). It is not necessary to consider the merit of such constitutional 
arguments here. 
283 See Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court 67 (1938) 
(“[F]ederalism is a response to size.”). 
284 See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1484, 1493 (1987) (reviewing Raoul Berger, Federalism: The Founders’ Design 
(1987)) (noting the argument that local government better reflects local preferences). 
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local preferences, rather than being subject to a uniform federal re-
gime that presumably represents a national preference.285 Moreover, 
the susceptibility of state authority to grassroots or local activism may 
increase the odds of civic participation and promote active democracy, 
which has value independent of whether participation leads to the ac-
tual adoption of a particular rule.286 
 State preferences are not set in stone. They can change or be un-
certain. To the extent a state needs to “discover” its preferences—as 
perhaps something different than the traditional remedial and insur-
ance law of the state, or as a confirmation of the wisdom of such tradi-
tion—the creation of a parallel health insurance market in which the 
states play a more significant role increases the likelihood that legal in-
novation and evolution will occur at the state level.287 A state has a 
greater incentive to confirm the preferences of its own citizens or serve 
as a “laboratory of benefits” if its regulatory decisions will not be re-
duced into nothingness by ERISA preemption or by the lack of an au-
dience of people to regulate.288 
 The iterative appeal of federalism as an organizational system for 
producing “better” rules rests on the notion that states will see what has 
worked or not worked in other states and make their own adjustments 
                                                                                                                      
285 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 284, at 1493 (“So long as preferences for govern-
ment policies are unevenly distributed among the various localities, more people can be 
satisfied by decentralized decision making than by a single national authority.”). 
286 See S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. 
Rev. 685, 712 (1991) (“[V]igorous republican federalism would repose substantial political 
authority in subnational governments because of their greater access to ordinary citizens 
and their participatory efforts.”); see also Jackson, supra note 264, at 2220–23 (describing 
the appeal of states as “loci” of political participation). Some have suggested this argument 
is no longer persuasive given the size of many states, or for other reasons. See, e.g., Rubin & 
Feeley, supra note 264, at 916 (questioning the assumption that federalism “fosters partici-
pation”); Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens’s Theory of Interactive Federalism, 74 Fordham L. 
Rev. 2133, 2140 (2006) (discussing that state size limits participation possibilities). Pre-
sumably the answer depends on the size of the state and the size of the issue. One imag-
ines that health care is an issue on which people have a strong impulse to be heard—
unlike, for example, the undoubtedly important but narrow in application question of 
prison reform—and that impulse is more easily satisfied (and considered by decision mak-
ers) when the relevant powers are reasonably close. See McConnell, supra note 284, at 1493. 
287 See Gerken, supra note 254, at 7 (noting that federalism engenders experimenta-
tion). But see generally Galle & Leahy, supra note 266 (examining the difficulties with the 
theory that state governments will innovate). 
288 State experimentation in health regulation has been proposed as attractive for 
some time. See, e.g., Eleanor D. Kinney, Clearing the Way for an Effective Federal-State Partner-
ship in Health Reform, 32 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 899, 935–36 (1999) (suggesting the benefits 
of providing a federal ERISA waiver to states, and noting the desirable effect of granting 
Hawaii a waiver). 
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accordingly.289 In many cases there is a credible counter-argument that 
states pay little attention to what other states do on various local mat-
ters. That is unlikely to be the case in connection with rules governing 
health bargains. Such law affects everyone, and successful innovation 
could greatly advance the careers of responsible policymakers.290 
 In addition, restoration of the states’ roles in selecting legal rules 
for health insurance promises reduces the impact of the policymaking 
role forced onto the federal judiciary by ERISA’s failure to provide use-
ful guidance on the appropriate tradeoff between security and cost.291 
Almost certainly, an allocation of rulemaking authority that relies less 
on judicial prerogative will be more likely to reach optimal legal rules 
for a given state. The larger the non-ERISA market for health insur-
ance, the less the aggregate effect federal judge-made rules will have. 
States can, according to their views on how power within the state 
should be allocated, assign different levels of authority to a variety of 
decision makers, along multiple dimensions. 
3. Clarity 
 Finally, opt-in federalism is an appealingly bright-line version of 
federalism. In many contexts, the line between federal and state au-
thority is difficult to draw, and thus it is difficult for private actors to 
appropriately plan for where that line will be drawn.292 Pure opt-in fed-
eralism is predictable. An individual decides at the bargain’s inception 
                                                                                                                      
289 Justice Louis Brandeis offered the most famous formulation of this principle: “It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.” New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). As with all elements of federalism, the innovation ration-
ale has been challenged. See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1485, 
1494–95 (1994) (explaining that there is literature on every side of every federalism issue). 
See generally Galle & Leahy, supra note 266 (examining difficulties with the theory that state 
governments will innovate); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federal-
ism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 593 (1980) (critiquing the idea that the state 
governments are innovative lawmakers). 
290 Mitt Romney might be the exception that proves the rule. See James Hohmann, Vot-
ers: ‘Romneycare’ Not Fatal, Politico (Mar. 6, 2011, 3:23 PM), http://www.politico.com/ 
news/stories/0311/50741.html (discussing the effect of Massachusetts health reform on 
Mitt Romney’s presidential aspirations). 
291 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a)(1) (West Supp. 2011). Recall that ERISA’s failure to pro-
vide useful guidance on the appropriate tradeoff between security and cost created this 
judicial policymaking role. See supra notes 117–119 and accompanying text. 
292 Cf. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 243, 
278–317 (2005) (describing the difficulties of drawing lines between state and federal au-
thority). 
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whether the bargain (or specific parts thereof) will be governed by fed-
eral or state law and expresses that choice in a way readily discernable 
to outsiders. Judges need not wade into the murky waters of line draw-
ing; the governing law is the chosen law.293 The parties on the other 
side of the bargain know in advance what law governs and can agree to 
strike the bargain under such terms or not. 
C. Objections to Opt-in Federalism 
 One can imagine a series of objections to opt-in federalism. A use-
ful way to group them is as concerns about (1) the content of the law 
created by opt-in federalism, (2) the undesirable systemic effects opt-in 
federalism could lead to, and (3) the utility of choice.294 
1. Content of Law 
 A central objection to classic federalism is that if power is reposed 
in the states to make law, they might use that power poorly—for exam-
ple, to create bad law. One variant of this argument is that the collective 
law of the states will overall be worse than federal law. The classic for-
mulation of this argument is the “race to the bottom” argument.295 
States, when “competing” to make law, may favor rules that are com-
petitively advantageous but socially undesirable.296 Race to the bottom 
arguments assume both that the law will develop in a certain direction 
                                                                                                                      
293 Id. 
294 I group them in this way for ease of consideration, not because alternative organ-
izational schemes are necessarily flawed. 
295 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating 
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977) (describ-
ing the race to the bottom argument in context of environmental standards). 
296 Environmental standards are a classic example. See, e.g., id. 
Given the mobility of industry and commerce, any individual state or com-
munity may rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high environmental stan-
dards that entail substantial costs for industry and obstacles to economic de-
velopment for fear that the resulting environmental gains will be more than 
offset by movement of capital to other areas with lower standards. 
Id. Businesses will use the threat of exit to deter a state’s instantiation of burdensome envi-
ronmental regulation. See id. The race to the bottom argument can in theory be reason to 
justify federal over state regulation in any case where the regulation “imposes costs on 
mobile capital.” Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-
to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210, 1211 
(1992). Dean Revesz has argued, however, that in the environmental context competition 
among states does not lead to an undesirable race to the bottom. Id. at 1211–12. 
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and that that direction will be unappealing.297 It is unlikely both will 
occur in an opt-in federalism system. 
 It is fairly clear that states (and presumably their populations) have 
different preferences for law.298 Those preferences reflect some value 
judgment about competing costs and benefits.299 An easy example is tort 
law. Expanded liability rules may have heightened the cost of doing 
business in a state, but by how much, and whether such is worth it to 
secure additional protection for those protected by the rule, is a matter 
on which individual states differ.300 One can construct theoretical ar-
guments as to why states may uniformly prefer protective rules that favor 
citizens or lenient rules that favor business.301 But the proof is in the 
pudding. Tort law varies considerably—many states have enacted tort 
reform, others have not—and so the argument that federalization is 
needed to prevent a race to the bottom is unpersuasive.302 As for the law 
governing insurance bargains: it is unlikely that every state will adopt 
weakly protective rules to attract business or strongly protective rules to 
assure citizens. That is not how it works currently; insurance law varies 
                                                                                                                      
297 If the former is not true, than we are dealing with simple legal diversity; if the latter 
is not true, we have either a race to the middle or a race to the top. Consider corporate 
law. Professor Cary famously claimed forty years ago that state competition led to a race to 
the bottom so undesirable that it should “arrest the conscience of the American bar.” Wil-
liam L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663, 705 
(1974). Other scholars have contended that competition has led to efficient law. See Bruce 
H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for Limited 
Liability Companies, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 91, 95 n.14 (identifying prominent works advanc-
ing a race to the top view of corporate law). 
298 Cf. Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, Symposium, Testing Two Assumptions 
About Federalism and Tort Reform, 14 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 371, 372–73 (1996) (noting that 
local governments are more in tune to local needs, which differ). 
299 See Maher & Stris, supra note 9, at 435 (noting competing values in determinations 
of legal rules). 
300 See, e.g., Eaton & Talarico, supra note 298, at 373 (arguing that local government is 
more in tune to local needs). 
301 See, e.g., id. (describing but empirically rejecting the argument that tort law results 
in a race to the bottom that favors resident plaintiffs). 
302 There are other arguments in favor of federalizing tort law, but they arise from dif-
ferent concerns, namely externality concerns, see, for example, Abigail R. Moncrieff, Fed-
eralization Snowballs: The Need for National Action in Medical Malpractice Reform, 109 Colum. L. 
Rev. 844, 861–88 (2009) (considering malpractice federalization as a solution to “snow-
ball” externalities); uniformity concerns, i.e., whatever the standards are, they should be 
the same everywhere; or, lastly, a simple desire to substitute the judgment of plaintiff-
friendly states with a national judgment that would make the country friendlier to indus-
try, see, for example, Michael A. Coccia, Uniform Product Liability Legislation: A Proposed 
Federal Solution, 51 Ins. Couns. J. 104, 104 (1984). 
2011] The Benefits of Opt-in Federalism 1787 
from state to state.303 That the potential market for state law is bigger 
post-ACA does not appreciably adjust our expectations for diversity.304 
 Another concern over quality of the law generated by federalism 
mechanisms is slightly different. The worry is not that states overall will 
be poor lawmakers, but that particular states could select unjust or oth-
erwise objectionable rules.305 That is, even if no race to the bottom oc-
curs, one may worry that a handful of states will maliciously or irre-
sponsibly pick rules that, for example, inappropriately protect the dis-
advantaged (or, conversely, unduly harm businesses). Jim Crow laws are 
the most potent historical example.306 
 The response is contextual. Certainly, worries that a particular 
state might poorly discharge its lawmaking responsibilities can be a very 
acute concern when dealing with rules that largely govern the fortunes 
of a marginalized group that lacks democratic voice within the state. 
Health insurance rules, on the other hand, are of direct interest to es-
sentially everybody. And even if one concedes that some states may get 
it wrong, the downside of error is smaller than in a national system. For 
example, ERISA is widely criticized not only because many disagree 
with the implicit judgments made by the Court, but because there is 
little opportunity to escape the Court’s rules.307 Opt-in federalism sup-
plies most individuals with an out in either direction: federal or state.308 
                                                                                                                      
303 See, e.g., Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: State Regulation of Insured Plans After Davila, 38 J. 
Marshall L. Rev. 693, 719–21 (2005) (describing differing state rules regarding bad faith). 
Obviously state insurance law differs in many ways. Insurance companies presumably price 
their premiums accordingly. An insurance company can make money in a high- liability state 
or a low-liability state. It depends on the premium. ACA permits pricing based on “rating 
area,” which should include a state’s legal rules. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg (West 2003 & Supp. 
2011). 
304 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a)(1) (West Supp. 2011). 
305 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, 70 U. Cin. L. Rev. 433, 445 
(2002) (explaining that federalism has been attacked for historically permitting states to 
pursue racist policies). 
306 Gerken, supra note 254, at 44 (“Pointing to federalism’s ugly role in preserving sla-
very and Jim Crow, . . . critics insist that states should not be allowed to depart from strong-
ly held national norms.”). 
307 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
308 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a)(1). What if there is no daylight between federal and 
state law, i.e., if State X simply adopts wholesale as its rules federal rules? That is unlikely to 
happen, given the robust presence of insurance rulemaking apparatus in the states. But 
assume it does. That is no worse than having an exclusively federal system that gets it 
wrong. More likely there will be daylight between federal and state rules (and between 
states) and thus individuals will have more choice than they do today, whether through an 
opt-in mechanism or traditional means of exit. 
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2. Systemic Concerns 
 Systemic concerns emanate less from the fear that states will pick 
undesirable rules in and of themselves than that they will chose rules 
which threaten the efficient discharge of national policy or the proper 
functioning of a federal system. 
 Often these arguments are phrased in externality terms.309 An ex-
ternality exists when a player does not fully internalize the cost (or 
benefit) of his conduct. The concern here would be that a state might 
externalize the cost of legal rules if the federal government is subsidiz-
ing the purchase of insurance. In other words, states might choose 
more costly rules because they know the rest of the country is going to 
help finance them.310 The strength of this argument obviously depends 
upon the rule in question and its incremental cost. More importantly, it 
is difficult to see how the federal subsidy in the ACA’s case (with respect 
to bargains, as opposed to entitlements) will result in a material adverse 
change in an individual state’s lawmaking calculus.311 Only a minority 
of individuals will receive a subsidy.312 Most individuals in a state will 
not receive a federal subsidy and thus will not be indifferent to more 
costly rules. They will have no worse incentive than before to ensure 
elected officials make appropriate judgments regarding the best mix of 
legal rules.313 
                                                                                                                     
 Another systemic concern might be related to adverse selection.314 
Individuals will be able to opt-in to different legal rules, depending on 
 
309 See, e.g., Moncrieff, supra note 302, at 861–88 (proposing malpractice federalization 
as a solution to “snowball” externalities). 
310 Cf. id. at 879–90 (noting that federal financing of entitlement programs whose cost 
is largely shaped by state action poses a theoretical case for federalization of medical mal-
practice reform). 
311 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B (West 2010 & Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2014), amended by 
Comprehensive 1099 Taxpayer Protection and Repayment of Exchange Subsidy Overpay-
ments Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-9, 125 Stat. 36; Department of Defense and Full-Year 
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38. 
312 See id. (specifying coverage subsidies). 
313 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(B)(i) (West Supp. 2011) provides that states may require “a 
qualified health plan offered in such State offer benefits in addition to the essential health 
benefits specified under section 18022(b) of this title” but that States must assume the cost 
of doing so. See id. § 18031(B)(ii) (“(ii). . . A State shall make payments—(I) to an individ-
ual enrolled in a qualified health plan offered in such State; or (II) on behalf of an indi-
vidual described in subclause (I) directly to the qualified health plan in which such indi-
vidual is enrolled; to defray the cost of any additional benefits described in clause (i).”) 
The degree to which a state’s legal rules are held to be “additional benefits” —and thus 
need to be paid for directly by the state—will, of course, affect the state’s rulemaking cal-
culus. 
314 See supra note 207 and accompanying text (explaining adverse selection). 
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their preferences. Because such choices will be made in connection 
with insurance promises, one might fear that insurance companies 
cannot accurately ascertain and price risk. This is possible but less likely 
than feared. While the analysis ultimately depends on the exact legal 
rules chosen, in general, adverse selection regarding insurance rules 
should be much less acute than adverse selection regarding health 
conditions. 
 With health conditions, the biggest fear is that individuals will not 
purchase insurance until they are actually sick (and the actually sick are 
the set of people who pose the largest payout risk to the insurance 
company). If that were the case—if insurance were only or mostly pur-
chased by sick people—premiums would be astronomical, to protect 
against the expected payout of the self-selecting pool. Legal rules are 
different. Imagine a state insurance regime with more protective reme-
dial rules than ERISA.315 The highest risk players to insurers in that re-
gime are those who have suffered an event which has or will immedi-
ately lead to litigation. Yet the litigation-causing event has already oc-
curred and is thus governed by the (less protective) legal rule of the 
regime under which it occurred.316 Certainly some degree of adverse 
selection is still possible, but the most worrisome instance will rarely 
happen. Residual concerns, to the extent they exist, can be addressed 
with measures such as enrollment periods. 
 I do not mean to dismiss adverse selection concerns; the aim is 
merely to point out that badgers can grow into bears in the telling. 
That is, while adverse selection is possible regarding any risk-sorting 
that insurance companies cannot appropriately price, assuming that 
permitting choice with regard to most legal rules (which, obviously, is a 
much larger set than rules of remedy) will have an adverse selection 
effect that requires as a solution that individual choice be eliminated 
seems a speculative overbid. Legal rules are a different matter than 
health conditions. Adverse selection concerns seem more potent re-
garding the latter than the former, and vary considerably depending on 
the specific legal rules at issue. And states, of course, can change the 
opt-in legal rules they conclude are leading to intolerable adverse selec-
tion. 
                                                                                                                      
315 A more protective legal regime should, in theory, mean higher premiums. How 
much higher is a matter of considerable dispute, as is whether such incremental higher 
cost is worth it. Such a dispute should be left up to the states. 
316 I am assuming legal rules do not apply retroactively, and that the governing legal 
rule corresponds to when the claim arose, rather than when the claim was filed. There are 
nontrivial administrative difficulties in such a case, of course, that need be considered. 
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 A final commonly made systemic argument against federalist ap-
proaches is one of administrative inefficiency.317 A single regime is less 
costly for private players to comply with (and for taxpayers to fund).318 
The Supreme Court has frequently stressed this point when interpret-
ing ERISA, by identifying the perils of disuniformity.319 The argument 
was that a lack of uniformity regarding health insurance rules increases 
the likelihood that the nation’s primary suppliers of health insurance— 
employers—will offer less generous (or no) health benefits to deal with 
the cost of complying with different state regulations.320 The objection 
carries comparatively little weight in an opt-in system. People choose 
between employer-provided insurance governed by federal standards 
and individual insurance sold by state insurers governed by state stan-
dards.321 There is no multi-compliance burden for either the employer 
or the insurer to bear; they live in different regulatory worlds and need 
not worry about traveling in-between.322 
3. Choice Difficulties 
 Much scholarship and literature over the past two decades has chal-
lenged long-held notions that choice is an unalloyed good.323 Choice 
might worsen outcomes if individuals are not particularly good at mak-
                                                                                                                      
317 See, e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault on Litigation: Why (and 
How) It Might Be Good for Health Law, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 2323, 2374 (2010) (discussing high 
compliance costs in federalist arrangements). 
318 See id. 
319 See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 105 (1983) (explaining that obli-
gating employers to differing state laws would increase administrative costs and effect a 
reduction of offered benefits); see also Monahan, supra note 127, at 1375–76 (describing 
primary burden of state regulation as forcing employers to comply with two regimes); 
Moncrieff, supra note 317, at 2374 (discussing high compliance costs in federalist ar-
rangements). Opt-in federalism is, of course, more administratively expensive than the 
alternative of having a single national policy regarding every aspect of health insurance, 
but such savings are only appealing to the extent one is utterly unmoved by the merits of 
federalism. 
320 See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 105; Monahan, supra note 127, at 1375–76. 
321 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(a)(1) (West Supp. 2011). 
322 Nor is there a reason to believe states will be administratively worse at promulgating 
and enforcing rules regarding health insurance bargains struck by in-state insurers than 
the federal government would be in regulating such insurers; states traditionally exercise 
authority in this area. This point should not be misconstrued. It is not that the state law-
making and administration regarding insurance is a picture of efficiency. It is that there is 
no particular reason to think that as a result of ACA permitting people to opt into state 
law, that state lawmaking will be comparatively inefficient. 
323 Cf. Ricciardi, supra note 40, at 85–111 (discussing cognitive biases that affect deci-
sion making). 
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ing choices.324 Information costs and a host of cognitive biases can di-
minish the appeal of relying on choice-driven mechanisms to order our 
individual and collective affairs.325 If in fact someone other than an in-
dividual “is likely to be the best decision-maker, or, better put, decision-
framer,”326 there may be a significant loss of utility when individuals opt 
out of the employment benefit bargain world into state insurance re-
gimes. 
 There are several responses. First, some individuals will make the 
right (or mostly right) choices. Opt-in regimes benefit them, and that 
positive should not be disregarded. Second, much choice criticism can 
be addressed through use of defaults, rather than abolition of 
choice.327 Nonetheless, I think the choice criticism has particular merit 
in the health insurance context because the most sensible default is 
probably a set of legal rules that are more, rather than less, protective. 
That is, as a policy matter, I would prefer if an opt-in system was set up 
in a way such that the default option is more protective of insureds, giv-
en their cognitive and bargaining limitations. ERISA, which is the de-
fault option under the ACA’s version of opt-in federalism, is on balance 
less protective of individuals than most state regulation. Nonetheless, 
indictments of default settings, in my view, should not obscure the ap-
peal of opt-in federalism in general. They simply mean the defaults 
should be adjusted.328 
                                                                                                                     
 Most importantly, we must consider the appeal of realistic alterna-
tives. That choices are imperfect does not mean no-choice centralized 
rulemaking is better. ERISA is the perfect illustration. Virtually no cred-
ible observer applauds its health content, yet no politically viable dis-
cussion of comprehensive reform of the statute has ever taken place. 
Choice infirmities, on the other hand, can be addressed, either at the 
federal level or at the state level through educational or informational 
mechanisms designed with cognitive limitations in mind.329 Indeed, 
 
324 See id. 
325 See id. 
326 McCaffery, supra note 216, at 7; see also supra note 40. 
327 See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 
70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1159, 1201 (2003) (suggesting the use of default rules that acknowledge 
information and cognitive limitations and encourage socially desirable choices). See gener-
ally Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 39 (same). 
328 Cf. Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 232, at 170–71 (considering the theoretical 
possibility that strategic behavior by employers could negatively affect choices). The solu-
tion to infirmities in the choice mechanism is to fix them, not abolish choice. 
329 See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 327, at 1201. 
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such is a ripe area for innovation, given the relative newness, but in-
creasing awareness, of such concerns. 
Conclusion 
 Age and sickness humble us all; such is the iron bargain of mortal-
ity. Whatever our philosophical comfort with life’s inevitabilities, prag-
matic questions remain: How should society allocate resources to ad-
dress age and illness? And what law should govern those arrangements? 
 A society can rely on individual resources, private bargains, or the 
government to address citizens’ retirement and health needs. The ACA 
is a landmark piece of health legislation that mandates people make 
insurance bargains. Both the wisdom of the bargain model and the 
constitutionality of the mandate have prompted intense discussion. In 
the heated debates over the ACA, however, little attention has been 
paid to the statute’s crucial innovation of law: opt-in federalism. This 
Article has theorized that, as a means of choosing and making law, opt-
in federalism promotes individual autonomy, encourages favorable evo-
lution of rules, accommodates legal uncertainty, recognizes varying 
preferences, empowers states, and can quietly undo previous legislative 
mistakes. 
 Time will tell whether the charm of theory earns the approval of 
practice. Yet the charm of theory is broad, because opt-in federalism is 
not limited to the ACA, or even the health context. It offers promise as 
a means to address the nation’s other enormous benefit challenge: re-
tirement security. I close by introducing that intriguing possibility. 
 Retirement is complex, and entitled to a full treatment, but the 
essentials are this. The United States relies enormously on private ar-
rangements to satisfy retirement needs.330 In the past, the dominant 
retirement vehicle was the “defined benefit” pension.331 Today, the 
dominant vehicle is the “defined contribution” savings account.332 The 
implications of the move away from defined benefit to defined contri-
bution arrangements have been increasingly studied by scholars in law, 
economics, and psychology.333 
                                                                                                                      
 
330 Current estimates of assets held in ERISA retirement plans exceed six trillion dol-
lars. Colleen E. Medill, Introduction to Employee Benefits Law: Policy and Prac-
tice 87 (3d ed. 2010). 
331 See Zelinsky, supra note 36, at 453. 
332 See, e.g., id. at 469–71. 
333 See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also Frank J. Landy & Jeffrey M. 
Conte, Work in the 21st Century 504 (3d ed. 2010) (industrial psychologists describing 
“psychological” effects of defined contribution arrangements on workers). See generally 
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 Because the vast majority of private retirement arrangements im-
plicate some level of fiduciary obligation, no one disputes the enor-
mous importance of optimizing fiduciary law. Currently, the develop-
ment of fiduciary law in the retirement context is almost entirely fed-
eral. This has been much criticized, mostly by scholars or stakeholders 
who believe federal rulemakers have simply gotten the contours of the 
law “wrong.”334 The correct substantive alternative is not clear. 
 Opt-in federalism represents a potential way to harness the power 
of aggregative and diversified policymaking while offering a check 
against races to the bottom and excessive compliance costs. For exam-
ple, one can imagine a defined contribution system where employers 
have a single duty: to have as the default choice an investment option 
that meets fairly conservative federal guidelines and is governed by a 
congressionally defined set of fiduciary duties. Other (or supplemental, 
if the federal investment is mandatory) choices for employees could be 
offered by non-employer investment firms and structured in such a way 
as to permit embrace of some combination of federal and state rules 
for fiduciary obligations. The rules for employers would be clear and 
uniform, but diversity in both investment options and law would be 
preserved. Obviously the specifics matter, and are complicated, but the 
notion of a protective federal core with state law options seems a more 
promising approach than either the status quo or traditional decentral-
ized options. 
 The ACA may be unwise in its substantive particulars; it may even 
be unconstitutional. The battles on those fronts are furious. But the 
legislation suggests an exciting new species of federalism that combines 
the virtues of choice and decentralization. It would be a shame if that 
were lost in the crossfire. 
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Plans (2004) (pension economists identifying policy challenges of 401(k) arrangements). 
334 See generally, e.g., Fischel & Langbein, supra note 52 (criticizing ERISA fiduciary law). 
Recently, the Department of Labor released proposed regulations regarding fiduciary status 
in connection with providing investment advice. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” 75 Fed. 
Reg. 65,263–78 (proposed Oct. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R pt. 2510). Various stake-
holders have expressed concern regarding the regulations. See, e.g., Letter from ERISA Indus. 
Comm. to Dep’t of Labor, Feb. 2, 2011, available at http://www.eric.org/forms/upload 
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